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Abstract 
 
Portugal’s strategic dogma to survive the war with its colonial empire intact was easy 
to explain, but strenuous to implement: to publicly maintain a strict neutrality, but when 
inevitable to collaborate to protect its interests, thus the term collaborating neutrality. In 
reality this demanded a cautious and skillful use of hedging. Juggling the interests of the 
several actors was complex and sometimes out of the control of Portuguese authorities. 
Portuguese and Japanese interests collide in the Asia theater in Macau and East Timor. 
Both territories of strategic importance to Japan: the former as a espionage center and the 
latter as a stepping stone to Australia. 
In 1940, having Macau surrounded, Japan clearly states its intention to pressure 
Macau to obtain oil concessions in Timor. In turn, this precipitated a policy of 
appeasement on two fronts: in Macau, Portugal must cede part of its sovereignty in Macau, 
allowing Japanese a broad spectrum of freedoms; and in Timor, a technical agreement 
establishing an air service between Palao and Dilli is signed. The Allies get involved and 
preemptively attack Timor, breaching neutrality and giving a legal justification to the 
following Japanese invasion and occupation of the territory.  
With Timor occupied by Japanese and Macau’s supply line completely under their 
control too, Portugal did its best to resist Japanese demands. The fate of Macau and Timor 
was linked.  
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Introduction 
 
The history of diplomatic relations between Portugal and Japan is long and well 
documented. Having been the first Europeans to arrive in Japan in 1543 (at a time the 
Kingdom of Portugal was establishing trade outposts all over the globe) the countries 
initiated a fruitful period of technological and cultural exchanges known as the Nanban 
Period. This period would last almost 100 years until 1639 when the shogunate closes 
Japan’s doors to the world. 
During the 16th century European Christian countries were motivated by the riches 
of Asia, known to Europe through the Silk Road, as well as by a missionary spirit 
characterize by its purpose of taking Christendom everywhere. The clergy, at the time 
one of the most powerful and educated classes in Europe, developed and improved 
important technologies such as the astrolabe and cartography and became important 
scientists in the Chinese Imperial Court. In Japan Jesuits were not acquainted with the 
central powers, instead they played an important cultural role and were at the forefront of 
intense publishing activity. The cultural importance of Jesuit priests at the time is still 
visible in the Japanese language in which more than 200 words originate from Portuguese 
and some are used to this day.  
Monuments marking the Portuguese arrival and presence in Japan can be found in 
Tanegashima, Kagoshima, and Nagasaki. These bounds have been cultivated by the two 
countries and every year the Portuguese Ambassador participates in the celebrations of 
the Teppō Festival in Tanegashima. 
During the Nanban Period, from 1543 to 1637, Portugal and Japan traded mainly silk, 
Chinese porcelain, and some tea. A new art style named after the period evolved and art 
historians are still drawn to Portuguese and Japanese museums to appreciate and study its 
famous prints, religious and decorative pieces.  
In a historical moment of cultural exchange from 1582 to 1586 an embassy 
constituted by four young Japanese men from Kyushuu  - Nakaura Julião, Itō Mancio,  
Hara Martinho, and Chijiwa Miguel - was sent to Europe through Macau and Goa. 
The Tenshō embassy (天正の使節) visited several cities namely Lisbon, Madrid, Toledo, 
Talavera de la Reina, and Rome and were received by hugh figures of the Church 
including Pope Gregory XIII and Pope Sixtus V, as well as royalty such as the King of 
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Spain and Portugal (at the time both thrones belonged to Phillip II of Spain/Phillip I of 
Portugal), and prominente traders such as Francesco I de Medici. 
In 1588 the Vice-King of Goa, at the time the center of the Portuguese territories in 
Asia, D. Duarte de Menezes wrote a salutation letter to Toyotomi Hideyoshi to which he 
received a reply of courtesy dated from 1592. The content of the documents is hardly 
important, but the acknowledgement of each other’s existence and use of state protocol 
is worth mentioning. 
Portuguese technology played an important role in the history of the bafuku, namely 
the musket. The grandfather of the rifle brought change to the war industry in Japan and 
was an important contributor to the unification of Japan in 1603 under the Tokugawa 
Shogunate system.  
The relations were not always peaceful, the religious problems brought to Japan by 
the introduction of a new religion to a country until recently politically volatile, 
confrontations between Portuguese and Japanese sailors and pirates, and later the 
European fighting over commercial supremacy, mostly between Portuguese, Spanish and 
Dutch, originated lots of diplomatic nuisances of different degrees of seriousness.   
The meddling of the Church in political affairs, and the intrigue caused by the 
political, economic, and religious rivalries between Europeans combined with the fear of 
colonialism strained the relations with the Japanese centers of political power. 
In 1587 Hideyoshi bans Jesuits from the territory and thirty three years later, in 1620, 
Christianity is officially banned from Japan, having to hide in the shadows. The 
martyrdoms of groups of Christians is well documented. The plight of Christians in Japan 
during the 17th century was recently featured in pop culture in Martin Scorsese’s movie 
“Silence” (2016). 
In 1640, the Bafuku showing its determination to remove Christianity and foreign 
influence from the territory kills 61 members of a mission from Macau. Given the 
importance of the Japanese trade to Macau, Portugal sent an Embassy in 1647 hoping to 
mend relations to no avail. 
After the period of ‘Closed Country’ or Sakoku, the relations were reestablished in 
1860 with the “Treaty of Peace, Friendship and Commerce”, signed after the US forced 
Japan to open its ports and in 2010 the 150th anniversary was celebrated by both embassies. 
Portugal was one of the many countries that signed an unequal treaty with Japan. Portugal 
did not participate in the Shimoneseki Convention of October 1864, but it participated in 
the Tariffs Agreement two years later.  
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It would take almost thirty years for the signing of a equal treatment  treaty with a 
most favorite nation clause. The Treaty of Commerce and Navigation is signed in 1897. 
Portugal decided to reopen its diplomatic representation in Japan and Wescelau de 
Moraes takes office as consul of Portugal in Kobe where his presence has been 
immortalized with a memorial. The consul was known for his love of Japanese culture 
and as a prolific writer of everything related to it, introducing Japan to a wide audience 
of Portuguese and English speakers. Atop of Mount Bizan in Tokushima, where he passed 
in 1929,  a museum in his honour has been erected. 
The fall of the Portuguese Monarchy and the birth of the Portuguese Republic in the 
beginning of the twentieth century was officially recognized by Japan on September 3, 
1911.  
The relevance given by Portugal to the diplomatic relations between the two 
countries leads to the creation of a permanent diplomatic post in Tokyo, the first official 
Portuguese Legation led by a Minister (not a Charge d’ Affaires) in 1920. 
On October 30, 1932, it is inaugurated a Japanese Legation in Lisbon, independent 
from the one in Madrid that up until that point was responsible for both countries. This 
Legation would remain in Lisbon until January 1946 when all members of the legation 
returned to Japan after the World War defeat. The Japanese Legation in Japan would play 
an important role in guiding the talks through the incidents and crisis of the Second World 
War. 
The topic of this research “Portugal’s ‘Estado Novo’ Diplomatic Relations with 
Japan during the Second World War” was selected in the hopes of contributing to a better 
understanding of this tumultuous period between the two countries. Portuguese 
historiography regarding the relations between Portugal and Japan focuses immensely on 
the sixteen, seventeen, and eighteen centuries relegating the last century to the back stove. 
Not only is there a gap regarding the last century, the topic of Macau has been altogether 
neglected. That can be explained by the difficulty of tracing its history through 
documentation. To study Macau one could spend decades analyzing documents from 
China, Japan, Hong Kong, and Portugal. Not only are these documents scattered, some - 
to what extend is impossible to tell - were destroyed during the Second World War due 
to lack of proper storage conditions. Some of the telegraphic communications stored at 
the Portuguese Diplomatic Archives has been eaten by bugs rendering them unreadable. 
The constant changes in Macau’s status during the post war period and the dwindling 
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numbers of Macanese people and the lack of a cohesive Macanese identity has led to a 
the lack of historiography. 
This has been changing recently. In a groundbreaking collaborative work edited by 
Geoffrey C. Gunn “Wartime Macau: Under the Japanese Shadow”, published in 2017, a 
group of researchers came together to interpret documents in different languages and 
analyze the documentation in several archives: Portugal, England, China, Macau, 
Australia, and Japan. João Botas, journalist, one of the contributors to said volume also 
published a book on the topic in 2012 “Macau 1937-1945, Os Anos da Guerra” with 
testimonials of main actors and regular people alike. João Botas’s blog “Macau Antigo”1 , 
started in 2008 and updated frequently, has become the best online source for documents, 
photographs, and testemonials about the daily life and publications on the history of 
Macau between the 16th  and 20th century. 
There’s still a lot of work to be done. Many researchers have studied the Second 
World War and how Salazar conducted foreign policy in moments of crisis, but the Macau 
crisis, except for the works preciously noted, has been given a few pages in broad range 
monographs. With the transfer of sovereignty of Macau from the Portuguese Republic to 
the Popular Republic of China in 1999 an effort to collect memorabilia and Macanese 
accounts of the events has been undertaken from which the author would like to mention 
“Macau Entre Dois Mundos”2  and the Centro Cientifico e Cultural de Macau, L.P. 
(CCCM) a research center, library, and publisher under the auspices of the Portuguese 
Ministry of Education and Science which focuses on the relations between Portugal (and 
the rest of Europe) and China taking advantage of Macau as a bridge between East and 
West. 
This effort at a better understanding of the relations between Portugal and Japan 
focuses on the Portuguese diplomatic communications and reports of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs (MNE). More than just understanding the outcome of the incidents and 
crisis, this work tries to understand what informed policy decision policy making and 
what informed the diplomatic actors.  The course of negotiations can be influenced by so 
many factors: personal opinion of the leaders or actors involved, international pressures, 
miscommunication, miscalculation, etc, the MNE reports often give us a fragmented yet 
important view on the main concerns and priorities of the decision makers and what they 
                                                                
1 http://macauantigo.blogspot.com (last visited January 25, 2019) 
2 Fernando Lima and Eduardo Cintra Torres, eds. Macau Entre Dois Mundos. (Lisbon: Editorial Inquerito, 
2004) 
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perceived as possible obstacles to the negotiations. The relations between the Portuguese 
and Japanese authorities, perceptions, and the difference between the Japanese civil and 
military authorities also influenced the outcome of foreign policy and were studied 
through diplomatic communications and memoirs. 
The Portuguese respectful attittude towards Japanese diplomatic staff at the end of 
the Second World War is often mentioned as a highlight of the long Portuguese – Japanese 
relationship. It is the author’s firm belief that a better understanding of the history between 
these two countries, especially the relations during difficult times, can lead to a better 
understanding of today’s relations and can open new paths of cooperation.  
The sources consulted are mainly primary sources collected from the Portuguese 
Archives, namely Torre do Tombo, were all the documentation regarding Salazar is 
archived, and the Ministry of Foreign Affairs Archive, where all the telegraphic and 
diplomatic correspondence is archived. For context, documents from the National 
Archives (England), the Magic Documents, JACAR resources online, and the Braga 
Collection located in Australia with a large online selection available were also consulted.   
It is necessary to inform that the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Portugal has been 
going through a restoration and re-cataloging process which means the same file can have 
two number’s reference. Since documents were collected in 2015, 2017, and in 2018 it is 
possible that some documents are referred to using the old reference numbers and some 
with the new.  
 
This dissertation is organized in three chapters:  
Chapter 1: Salazar’s ‘Estado Novo’ Foreign Policy Decision Making, introduces both 
the dictator and the regime since it is necessary to understand the forces behind the 
machine to understand its reaction to the crisis; 
Chapter 2: Macau. It starts with the explanation of the Portuguese presence in the 
island and its vulnerability to the events in China. It tracks the diplomatic communications 
regarding the difficult years of Macau since the second Sino-Japanese War and details 
the gradual asphyxiation of the territory, the gradual fading of Portuguese sovereignty 
into Japanese hands, and how Macau was kept hostage of the situation in Timor.  
Chapter 3: Timor. This chapter details the gradual penetration of Japanese in the 
island economic structure and foreign investment arrangements, as well as the reactions 
of the Allied forces to this encroachment. It connects the ever demanding Japanese 
requests with Macau’s supply lane, and the Portuguese difficult negotiating position when 
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confronted with British demands. it explores the loss of sovereignty of east Timor, first 
to the Allies and then to Japan. Furthermore, it studies the documentation regarding the 
negotiations between Portugal and Japan and explains how the international powers and 
their interests influenced Salazar’s decision making. 
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Chapter 1: Salazar’s ‘Estado Novo’ Foreign Policy Decision Making 
 
António de Oliveira Salazar was a man of his time. His rise to power in the late 
twenties and beginning of the thirties reflects both the international and national 
circumstances. 
Established in 1139, one of the oldest European monarchies, the regime was 
struggling since the end of the 19th century. Its inability to modernize, combined with the 
royal family lavish expenses and lack of political legitimacy propelled mainly after the 
diplomatic crisis known as the ‘Pink Map Ultimatum’ - when Portugal was forced to give 
up its claims over the territories between Angola and Mozambique because they 
conflicted with British interests - encouraged republicans to organize a revolution that 
deposed the King on October 5, 1910.  
The First Republic of Portugal was characterized by its internal struggles for power 
between the several factions of republicans. In its sixteen years, the First Republic 
produced a stunning 40 Chiefs of State – the equivalent of today’s Prime Ministers - and 
eight Presidents. This instability created a national environment where anarcho-
syndicalist activity and violent confrontations between the factions proliferated and made 
it impossible to put forward a coherent political agenda or even guidelines. 
The anti-parliamentary movement grew stronger and on May 28, 1926 the military 
headed yet another revolution that established a temporary military dictatorship. This 
revolution was supported by ideologically different actors from republicans to 
monarchists to nationalists.  
Without a political project, its first actions were to dissolve the parliament – seen as 
the source of instability - and to suspend the 1911 Constitution. However, the instability 
continued and in need of legitimacy, elections took place in 1928. The sole candidate 
Óscar Carmona won the election and one of his priorities was to balance the chaotic 
budget. For that enterprise he chose Salazar, an economics and finance teacher at the 
renowned Coimbra University. 
 
In fact, Salazar had already been selected as the Minister of Finance twice by 
previous military governments from June 3, 1926 to June 17, 1926 (13 days) and from 
June 17, 1926 to June 19, 1926 (two days), to a total of 15 days. During this short period 
of time Salazar did not manage the Ministry. He initially accepted the position, realizing 
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soon enough that said governments were not stable and in those conditions, it would be 
impossible to succeed, Salazar quit claiming his health unable him to fulfill the job. 
   
António de Oliveira Salazar, the origins 
Born in 1889 in a small countryside town called Santa Comba Dão to a modest small 
land owner family, Salazar was raised in a catholic fashion and excelled in his studies. In 
a country with limited access to education3 - even elementary - it was financially difficult 
to pursue higher studies. Indeed, people who attended school at the time predominantly 
completed solely a primary education of four years.  
Later in life Salazar would, for the sake of political narrative, exaggerate his modest 
upbringing claiming to be from a ‘poor’ family when in reality his family was in a much 
better financial situation than the average Portuguese. Even so, it would have been 
difficult for his family to support his studies further. Due to his academic success and his 
commitment to the catholic faith, he would continue his studies as a seminarist. The 
church provided secondary education to those who could not afford it, educating them in 
catholic ethics, doctrine, and theology paving the way to priesthood.  
Salazar’s academic achievements at the seminary were impressive and even though 
he decided not to choose priesthood he became a teacher at a religious school. 
Furthermore, he kept a close, personal relation with important members of the institution 
throught his life. 
In 1910 he was admitted to Coimbra University and started his studies in law. With 
the implementation of the highly anti-clerical First Republic in 1910, Salazar’s world 
views were dismissed by the political power, but Salazar gained notoriety within the 
catholic audience through an organization called CADC (Christian Democrat Academic 
Center). Proposing a renovation of the country through education and patriotism ‘Deus, 
Pátria e Família’ (God, Fatherland, and Family) which became his motto.  
Graduating in 1914 with honors, Salazar focused his intellect on political economy 
producing two dissertations on the topic of how to reinvigorate Portuguese agriculture, 
Portugal’s most important sector. In 1916 he became the head of the Economic and Social 
Sciences department at Coimbra University. 
In 1921 Salazar was elected for the first time to public office as a member of the CCP 
(Portuguese Catholic Center) a political party created in 1917 but marginalized in the 
                                                                
3 In the 1930’s the illiteracy rate in Portugal was 60%. Source: António Candeias et al., Alfabetização e 
Escola em Portugal nos Séculos XIX e XX. (Lisbon:, Fundação Calouste Gulbenkian, 2007), 40. 
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political sphere, with a small constituency. Salazar was chosen for several budget related 
commissions, a recognition of his fiscal knowledge and of his ascent within the Christian 
organizations. However, due to the political instability the parliament was dissolved mere 
three months later.  
 
Salazar’s rise to power 
After 16 years of instability, worsened by World War I, there was a military coup 
d’étad that initiated a period called Military Dictatorship (Ditadura Militar). It was during 
this period that Salazar started his political ascension. As previously stated, by 1926 
Salazar was an established academic with little political experience, and even though he 
quickly resigned the position as Minister of Finance he accepted the presidency of a 
commission designed to assess the state’s tax revenue and produce fiscal reform. He 
started going to Lisbon frequently using this opportunity to discretely network with 
political actors. 
The Military Dictatorship could not bring political stability to the system. During this 
period, Salazar published several articles and gave a few interviews4 publicly heavily 
criticizing Sinel de Cordes, active Minister of Finances, for his inability to control public 
spending. Salazar was gaining support across different ideological spheres, not just the 
catholic circles, and became a proponent for national fiscal reform. 
The reform proposed by Salazar was more than just a fiscal reform, it was a national 
moral reform, based on Christian values of respect for hierarchy, commendation of 
frugality, and simplicity.  
In 1928 General Carmona was elected President and started a new period called 
National Dictatorship (Ditadura Nacional).  
Salazar became the Minister of Finance and slowly consolidated his power through 
a process of politically controlling the budget and gradually becoming indispensable to 
the dictatorship. Salazar’s ability to balance the budget led to international praise5 and 
Portugal’s international image improved due to his fiscal policies based on autarky, 
protectionism, austerity, and investment in public infrastructure. 
The Ministry of Finance, responsible for international legitimacy – much appreciated 
after decades of being consistently belittled due to its political instability – gradually 
became more powerful and so did Salazar.  
                                                                
4 Filipe Ribeiro De Meneses,  Salazar, A Political Biography (New York: Enigma Books, 2009): 38-39. 
5 Ibid, 51. 
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Salazar maintained his position despite internal struggles within the dictatorship. He 
asked complete control of the budget and in 1930 became Minister of Colonies, 
demanding a centralization of colonial fiscal policy in Lisbon and strengthening the 
Minister of Finance through the Colonial Act (Acto Colonial) of 1930. 
At times unpopular within the military ranks, who saw their budgets cut and struggled 
with a gradual transfer of power to civilians, their support was important to the 
maintenance of his position, furthermore his relationship with President General Carmona 
was essential in order to maintain political power. 
Fiscal and agricultural reform combined with investment in the infrastructure and the 
industrial investment that these reforms were enabling, created growth. This growth had 
to be subordinated to the national interest, thus economic activity was highly controlled 
by the state – corporatism -, the individual, working in the name of the Pátria, was to 
respect hierarchy and at the top of this hierarchy Salazar was to steer the country into 
moral correctness. Excessive individualism and communism were enemies of the nation. 
The nation needed education in order to create an elite capable of leading the country, but 
also to instill these principles in the population.  
Censorship guaranteed information was framed within Salazar’s idea of national 
interest; organizations such as National Union (União Nacional) provided public support 
and even legitimization through a constructed idea of public consensus and acceptance of 
the dictatorship. After 1934 Salazar would let the National Union fade away after it no 
longer served its purpose. 
The creation of the National Political Council in 1932, organ responsible for advising 
President Carmona, further strengthened Salazar’s position since Salazar used the 
appointment of the members strategically reinforcing his political control. 
From 1926 to 1932 Salazar became indispensable and surrounded himself with allies 
strong enough to fight his opponent becoming President of the Council of Ministers in 
1932. 
 
‘Estado Novo’ 
‘Estado Novo’ literally means New State and this nomenclature easily reflects 
Salazar’s intentions and aspirations. As previously stated, Salazar wanted to bring the 
country together, revitalize the nation through morals and respect for traditional values. 
This endeavor could not be achieved over night and even though Salazar had substantial 
power during the National Dictatorship he believed he was the one who truly understood 
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national interest, thus being a powerful member and controlling the finances of the 
government was not enough. Salazar actively searched for control; he fought for power 
despite his narrative of accepting political responsibility as a personal sacrifice. 
His ideological beliefs were hardly original, a profound disbelief in parliamentary 
democracy and distrust in the Wilsonnian institutions was common place in the non 
anglo-saxonic world during the 1930s. 
Salazar’s source of power was the new Constitution of 1933. This constitution framed 
his action and its main objective was to support the government goals: to protect national 
interest. For that purpose - and because Europe was facing a complex situation with the 
rise of communist on the east and the proliferation of several forms of fascism - the 
constitution was malleable.  If need be, the government could easily change or reinterpret 
it to fulfill its objectives.  
The new constitution established the separation between Church and State, banned 
political parties and independent unions, only allowing the state-controlled syndicates to 
be the voice of the worker who, despite the improvement of the country’s economy, 
continued to live in a difficult situation with limited access to services. 
Central to the ‘Estado Novo’s’ national interest, was the maintenance of the colonial 
system. Salazar was content with the territories currently under Portuguese authority, he 
was not looking to expand the colonial Empire, but to manage it properly having as 
priorities the political unity and financial solvency of the territories. 
The decision-making process was highly centralized, especially during crisis, such 
as the Spanish Civil War. Prior to 1932, Salazar had been mostly interested in domestic 
politics, but when he took office in 1932, gradually started taking interest in this field. 
The Spanish Civil War marked a transition, Foreign Policy became essential for the 
survival of the state, thus in 1936 he took over the Ministry of Foreign Affairs to better 
control the Portuguese answer to the Spanish problem. 
Also in 1936, Salazar took over, even if for a shorter period of time, of the Ministry 
of War, reforming the Portuguese military and attempting to modernize it the best he 
could while maintaining a balanced budget.6 
At this stage, Salazar biggest threat were not the communists. He could control most 
communism threats through censorship and the action of the Political Police. The biggest 
threat came from the other side of the expectrum, namely fascist sympathizers who 
                                                                
6 See Appendix “Salazar’s List of Functions”. 
13 
 
wished Salazar would go further right, following Mussolini’s footsteps. Eventually 
Salazar was capable of dealing with this National-Syndicalist movement by integrating 
some of the moderate members of the movement in the system and forcing the rest to 
exile or jail. 
Just like other countries at the time, Portugal also created a youth movement - 
Portuguese Youth (Mocidade Portuguesa) - to instill loyalty and moral principles in 
children. However, the lack of infrastructures such as schools or recreational centers 
meant that not every child – far from it – belonged to their ranks. The Church was able to 
play a big role in this organization imposing its moral code. The institution was 
particularly relevant after the outbreak of the Spanish Civil War with the main objective 
of preventing the Portuguese youth of sympathizing with leftist ideas. 
Salazar’s relations with the church after coming to power were not always easy. In 
the beginning of the 1930s and in order to appeal to a broader public he distanced himself 
from the institution on a political level, continuing to promote catholic morality as a 
fundamental basis of Portuguese culture and identity. Salazar, who had been a seminarist 
and was best friends with the soon to be Cardinal Cerejeira, did not want the Church to 
have political influence over him, he wanted the institution to be confined to the cultural, 
educational/moral, and social realm.  
Also created in 1936, Portuguese Legion (Legião Portuguesa) was a grass-root 
movement against leftist ideas that Salazar simply allowed to exist, he did not come up 
with the idea, neither was he particularly interested in it and, like many other, eventually 
used economic power, namely lack of funding, to let it wither. 
Portuguese people were mostly uneducated whose main concern was to make ends 
meet and most historians agree7 were not interested in politics. More than liking Salazar, 
most Portuguese seemed to tolerate him and be thankful for the political stability. 
Nevertheless, the State was ruthless regarding the control of the population: free 
assembly was illegal and so was the publishing of propaganda without going through 
prior authorization. PVDE, the political police, would imprison, interrogate, and even 
torture; furthermore the population was encouraged to report suspicious activity. The 
most undesirable prisoners were sometimes sent to a prison camp in Cape Verde, called 
Tarrafal where a high percentage would die due to disease8. 
                                                                
7 Filipe Ribeiro De Meneses, Salazar, A Political Biography (New York: Enigma Books),124. 
8 Ibid, 155. 
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Salazar believed in the use of violence in a limited way by the state. In fact, one of 
his main criticisms of fascism was the indiscriminated use of force with respect to no 
moral code or legal boundary9. That being said, he saw communism as a threat to not just 
his regime, but to civilization, and communist sympathizers were imprisoned and tortured 
under the radar, many other escaped to the colonial territories where the political police 
could not stretch its reach. 
Salazar also criticized fascism’s cult of personality refusing to participate in mass 
rallies. That does not mean he did not manipulate his public image. His narrative was 
carefully constructed to emphasize his humble upbringing, his Catholicism, and his 
meritocratic rise to power. He paid attention to his image abroad too, dealing carefully 
with foreign press, inviting journalists to visit Portugal and offering them translations of 
his speeches. The international society developed an interest in his character featuring 
articles in newspapers and magazines, curious about the men who had balanced the 
budget of a country known for turmoil and political instability. 
 
‘Estado Novo’s’ Foreign Policy Decision Making 
Salazar, as previously stated, centralized most of the power in himself. He completely 
controlled FPDM in between 1936 and 1947 when he was the head of the Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs. He monopolized the decision making, trusting a limited number of 
diplomats that he placed in the most important diplomatic positions.  
He allowed the people he trusted to criticize his policy, but only in private. No 
displeasure should be made public or transmitted through official diplomatic 
correspondence. 
Armindo Monteiro, one of Portugal’s finest diplomats, anglophile accredited in 
London, nurtured magnificent relations with the British elite and was often frustrated with 
Salazar for his stubbornness and, at times, not fully committed alliance with Great Britain. 
In 1943, Salazar dragged the negotiations regarding the Azores’ concessions to Great 
Britain trying to get as much as he could from the old allie. This back and forth, lead 
Monteiro to his limit and on July 1, 1943, Monteiro wrote a 17-page long letter criticizing 
Salazar’s foreign policy and even his world view. Salazar and Monteiro had had their 
disagreements before, but they were never publicly known. Salazar was not accustomed 
to this sort of reaction and was absolutely furious with Monteiro, accused him of wanting 
                                                                
9 Ibid, 171, 
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“to write history”10 and even though Monteiro was incredibly well connected in Great 
Britain, Salazar fired him, in the most non-scandalous manner possible. 
Aristides Sousa Mendes also met the end of his diplomatic career after disobeying 
Salazar. Portuguese consul in Bordeaux at the time of the German invasion of Paris, in 
1940, and against Salazar’s orders, it is believed that, incapable of turning his back to the 
human drama of the time, he emitted thousands of visas (permitting safe entrance in 
Portugal) without Lisbon’s permission.11 Salazar was fearful these actions would cause 
friction with Nazi Germany and prioritize national interest over his Christian principles 
of solidarity. 
 
Salazar’s Foreign Policy Priorities 
Salazar’s foreign policy priorities related to his idea of nation. The maintenance of 
the empire and maintenance of national independence was at the top of his list. 
The alliance with Britain, the oldest in Europe and of great historical importance, was 
essential to Salazar particularly because it was the cornerstone of the maintenance of the 
colonial empire in Africa. Regardless Salazar did not always trust the British, fully aware 
that they had several times tried to negotiate peace with Germany at the expense of the 
Portuguese colonial jewel, Angola.  
Neutrality was another important priority for the Salazar’s regime. Being neutral 
guarantied, at least according to international law, that the colonies were protected. 
Portugal knew that in order to maintain its neutrality and avoid becoming a battlefield, 
Spain needed to be neutral too. Spain had, since the beginning of its existence, had 
members who dreamed of Iberian Spain, even within Franco’s regime some shared this 
opinion. It was vital for Portuguese survival that Spain was not fully militarized and 
actively engaging the war. Even if Spain did not attack Portugal for expansionist purposes, 
if Spain were dragged to the European war, the lack of geographical frontiers, meant that 
there was a high probability Portugal would too. 
Furthermore, neutrality allowed Portugal to profit from the war. Salazar rejected 
claims that he was profiting from the war arguing that would go against his Christian 
world view, but if we look at the numbers it is obvious that Portugal was engaging in 
economic activities that contributed to the prolongation of the war for profit. By 1943 
Portugal was Germany’s main supplier of wolfram.  
                                                                
10 Bernardo Futscher Pereira, A Diplomacia De Salazar (1932-1949). (Alfragide: Dom Quixote, 2013), 369. 
11 Ibid, 219. 
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England supported Portugal’s neutrality because it was essential for the maintenance 
of Spanish neutrality and keeping Spain out of the war was a priority for the Allied. 
England relied on Salazar, who nurtured a friendship like relationship with Franco, to 
curb his war enthusiasm.  
Portugal’s neutrality came at a price for England, as a neutral country Portugal could 
not deny selling wolfram to Germany, at least not morally. England tried to buy as much 
wolfram as it could, selling to the highest bidder is not against neutrality policy, it can be 
easily explained as economics 101, but with the prolonged war effort England lost the 
ability to buy such amounts and by 1943 Germany’s war industry depended on Portuguese 
wolfram12. Portugal would agree to stop selling wolfram altogether after the tides of war 
make it obvious the Allies are going to win, and at a time Portugal needed the Allied 
support to regain control of East Timor. 
Salazar believed internationalism and cosmopolitanism were based on wishful 
thinking, not the reality of international politics. He distrusted the League of Nations, 
participating in it solely to reap what he could, but truly skeptical of its importance. In 
fact, when Japan abandoned the League the reaction of the Portuguese Government was 
“the MNE refuses to comment on this topic. It is between the government of Tokyo and 
Geneva”13.  
According to Salazar’s world view, Portugal was a colonial and Atlantic oriented 
nation.  
During the Second World War, Azores and Cape Verde, important strategic points in 
the Atlantic, became Portugal’s bargaining chip, but at the same time a source of concern 
and dispute. 
In May 1941, Roosevelt publicly stated that the US should and would if need be 
invade the Azores and Cape Verde. Salazar protested through Bianchi, the head of the 
Delegation in Washington.     
Even though the US only entered the war in December of 1941, the US had been 
developing an interest in Portugal because it believed Germany was about to take over 
the Azores which would transform the Atlantic war theater and be highly problematic to 
England and the US not only because it would allow vessels, ships, and submarines to 
refuel, but also because it could jeopardize the access to the mediterranean. 
                                                                
 
13 Newspaper “O Século”, edition 28th  March 1933 
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Eden, in Lisbon, was also trying to negotiate an agreement with Portugal regarding 
the usage of Azores.  
The situation changed, suddenly American and British intelligence asserted that 
Germany was not going to invade the Azores after all, it was going to focus its efforts 
fighting the soviet front. This strategic change gave Salazar one year and a half before 
Azores became, once again, a source of international contention.  
During the Second World War, especially after the war theater started to tilt towards 
the allies, Great-Britain started to be more aggressive in its requests, namely authorization 
to use the Azores and the immediate halt of wolfram transactions with Germany. Salazar 
- surrounded by Japanese in Macau and with the lost of de facto sovereignty in East Timor 
– ended up agreeing, but not without getting as much as he could in return, namely support 
to the reoccupation of Timor, at least in paper.   
In 1943, after postulating immensely, pushing British limits, and confronted with a 
totally different international theater, Salazar made concessions to the usage of the islands 
to Great Britain and, the next year, to the US.  
Finally, Salazar believed democracies and liberal regimes belonged in the past. 
Having the world divided in two spheres of influence between democratic states and 
communist states was a terrible idea; furthermore, the complete destruction of Germany 
was a terrible idea because, Salazar believed, Germany was essential to fight Russian 
communism.  
 
Portuguese Neutrality 
As previously stated, Salazar’s neutrality policy was rooted in his foreign policy 
priority: maintain the Empire. Not only that, mainting economic stability was essential to 
the survival of the regime. Portugal at the turn of he century was highly volitile and 
Salazar’s policies were tolerated to great extent because the economy was improving and 
there was some investment in services such as schools, access to health care, etc. 
Just like the constitution and its interpretation, the neutrality policy was flexible. It 
adapted, even when Salazar claimed it to be carried in a strict manner. 
Salazar frequently addressed the inconvenience of neutrality publicly stating that the 
warring nations tend to ignore neutral’s interests and often make requests impossible to 
fufill without breaching neutrality status. Additionally, Salazar pointed out that Portugal, 
as a Christian Nation, refused to make profit of the war (which was not precisely true) 
and refused to become an instrument of war, and due to the fact Portugal would have to 
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refuse businness opportunities to refrain from colliding with great powers neutral policy 
was expensive. Once again, Salazar used the narrative of sacrifice, this time at a national 
level. 
On his adress to the public on June 25, Salazar stated “The concept of neutrality is 
up to constant revision and can never be definitive. It depends more in the facts than the 
objectives, it depends more on others’ disrespect than in our desire to maintain it. (…) 
The desire for neutrality cannot come above national interest.” Has we will see, in 
February 1942, Portuguese sovereignty in Timor is disrespected by Japan and soon after 
Portugal starts negotiating an agreement with England that would allow Portugal to be 
involved in the process of retrieving the island. 
He develops this ideia of adaptable neutrality once again on his adress to the country 
in April 27, 1943: “In the beginning of the conflict the Government could define its 
neutrality status as not inconditional. Obviously, it could never forget the dignity and 
interests of the Nation, as well as the existance of the alliance with Great Britain, that at 
such a dark, difficult moment we couldn’t but show loyalty to.” 
Finally, the term ‘collaborative neutrality’ is not a term coined by historians. Salazar 
himself used the term. 
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Chapter 2: Macau 
 
 
“The city-state’s role in international trade, as a beach-head for Christianity, as a filter for 
Western ideas, as a city of sanctuary for political reformers in China, as a neutral base 
during the war, and as a cultural avant garde on the coast of China deserves to be better 
told.” [on Macau] Geoffrey C. Gunn 
 
Portugal’s sovereignty over Macau remains an interesting topic. Both the origins of 
the Portuguese settlement and the level of sovereignty/independence from the Chinese 
authorities have been debated, but most studies produced until the 20th century by both 
parties seem to be biased perspectives with the objective of justifying territorial claims in 
disputed areas.  
The purpose of this dissertation is not to bring clarity to the topic of Portuguese 
sovereignty in Macau, but it’s important to understand the history of Portuguese presence 
in the territory so we can comprehend the complex political and cultural environment in 
which the political decision-making process developed.  
In the beginning of the 16th century the relation between Europe and Asia was 
changing. Asia, especially China, was mostly known in Europe through the adventures of 
Marco Polo during the late 13th century. In fact, the Silk Road had been an important 
exchange center between the East and West for centuries, but the maritime developments 
of the 15th and 16th century shortened the distance between Europe and Asia allowing the 
establishment of new trade routes thus the exponential increase in trade and cultural 
exchanges. Prior to the new routes, trade with Asia was made through land or through the 
Mediterranean controlled my Genoa, Venetia, and Muslim traders, but later, with the 
taking of Constantinople in 1453 by the Ottoman Empire, the products became pricier 
due to taxes imposed by the ottomans and European countries needed a way to bypass the 
Mediterranean and Constantinople thus finding alternative routes became a priority. 
Portugal was at the forefront of the European ‘Expansionist Era’ for several reasons: 
first, Portugal has an extensive Atlantic coastal line; secondly, Portuguese Kings hired 
sailors and had the help of Jesuit scholars who developed technology and substantially 
improved maps. 
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The wealth generated combined with the prevailing belief in the right of conquest 
and the idea of evangelization led the European powers to the establishment of 
commercial outposts and colonial systems all over the world.  
In 1509 when the navigator Diogo Lopes Sequeira and his crew arrived in Malacca 
the encounter between the Portuguese and Chinese merchants is documented: 
“We ask about the Chinese, where are they from, from how far, how often they come 
to Mallaca or to their trading posts, what goods they trade, how many ships come every 
year, what their ships are like, if they go back the same year, if they have official outposts 
in Mallaca or elsewhere, if they are wealthy merchants, if they weak men or warriors, if 
they have weaponry, what garments they wear, if they are robust men and overall body 
constitution, if they are Christian or Gentile, if their land is big, if there’s more than one 
King amongst them, if there are any Muslim amongst them or others that do not share 
their laws and beliefs, and if they are not Christian what do they belief and worship, what 
customs do they follow, and to where does their land stretches, and whom they trust.”14 
 This document further states that the Captains of the Chinese junks claimed to have 
heard about the Portuguese sailors before and warned the Portuguese not to trust the 
Muslims in Malacca. Given that Diogo Lopes Sequeira was unable to establish a trading 
post, part of his crew was imprisoned, he barely escaped capture and almost lost his ships 
it seems that it was sound advice. 
 In December 10 of 1510, Afonso de Albuquerque conquers Goa, in India, a prosper 
port that became the political center of Portuguese India from where the Viceroy governed 
the Portuguese possessions in Asia for the next centuries.  
 It was from Goa that the expedition to conquer Malacca, an important spice trading 
port, left in April 1511 headed by ‘the Great’ Afonso de Albuquerque. Malacca was 
conquered in August 1511, but the Malayan-Portuguese War lasted until 1641 when the 
Dutch occupied the territory. The belligerents against Portugal were the Sultanate of 
                                                                
14 In “A Presença de Portugal em Macau”, António da Silva Rego, 1946, documento original ANTT: -- CC, 
I, 6-82: “Item. Pregumtarees pollos Chins, e de que parte veem, e de cam lomge, e de quamto em quanto 
vem a Mallaca ou aos lugares em que trautam, e as mercadaryas que trazem, e quamtas naaos delles vem 
cada anno, e pellas feyçoees de suas naaaos, e se tornam no anno em que veem, e se teem feitores ou cassas 
em Mallaca ou outra alguuma terra, e se sam mercadores ricos, e se sam homeens fracos se guerreiros, e se 
teem armas ou artelharias, e que vestidos trazem, e se sam gramdes homeens de corpos e toda a outra 
enformaçam delles, e se sam christãos se gentios, ou se he grande terra a sua, e se teem mais de huum rey 
antre elles, e se vyveem antre elles Mouros ou outra allguma gente que nam vyya na sua ley ou crença e, 
se nam sam christãos, em que creem ou a que adoram, e que custumes guardam e pera que parte se estemde 
a sua terra, e com quem confynan.” 
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Malacca, the Sultanate of Johor, Ming China, and from 1607 the Dutch East India 
Company.  
During the first half of the 1400s China was a naval power. Its merchants regularly 
went to Africa sailing ships far bigger than Columbus’. In Asia China had established a 
powerful tributary system. 
When in 1511 Portugal conquered Malacca it attacked a country under the Ming’s 
tributary system and as such protected my China. The Sultan filled a complaint with the 
Emperor. 
In 1514 Jorge Álvares reached Tamao and became the first Portuguese to reach China 
by sea route. Three years later in 1517 Captain Fernão Peres d’Andrade takes his ships to 
Guangzhou as an official emissary of King Manuel of Portugal. The embassy headed by 
Captain Peres d’Andrade and Tomé Pires established first official contacts between 
Portugal and China and the mission was a success at first to the extent they were allowed 
to proceed to Beijing. The violent and reckless actions of Simão d’Andrade, amongst 
others, who defied mandarinal authorities and built a fort in Tuen Mun, combined with 
the news of the events in Malacca lead to the events known as the first and second Battles 
of Tamao in 1521 and 1522. 
 The Chinese Imperial Government imprisoned and executed several Portuguese 
diplomatic envoys in Guangzhou and later in 1521 refused to accept the Portuguese 
Embassy. The prisoners were used as leverage to restore the deposed Sultan of Malacca. 
Tomé Pires was forced to write letters to several Portuguese authorities including the 
King of Portugal requesting the return of the status-quo.  Furthermore, Chinese trading 
posts in Malacca maintained their commercial ties with the Javanese and Malayan 
merchants instead of the Portuguese given that the Emperor forbad trade with Portugal.  
After the conquest of important trading posts such as Goa and Malacca and several 
smaller posts in the region the Imperial Court questioned Portugal’s commercial interest 
in China. Nevertheless, driven by greed local mandarins accepted bribes and allowed 
Portuguese merchants to trade illegally in a nearby island called Shangchuan (Ilha de São 
João, Saint John Island), later in Liam-Po from where they were expelled in 1545. 
 A series of domestic disasters, epidemics, fear that merchants were becoming too 
rich and powerful, the fight against the Mongols far from the ocean meant that China’s 
naval power dwindled and in 1525 the government mandated the destruction of all 
oceangoing ships. Obviously not all were destroyed, pirates were able to live outside of 
the scope of local authorities and their raids became a big problem for seaside settlements. 
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Having arrived in Japan in 1542, Portuguese sailors and merchants gradually 
established a trade route between Malacca – Macau – Japan. In the beginning, as 
previously stated, the Portuguese were limited to trade in the nearby islands but trading 
Japanese products in Canton was highly profitable and the merchants were eager to 
establish a permanent post. In 1553 or 1554 under the guise of drying its cargo after a 
complicated journey, Portuguese ships arrive in Macau where they were allowed to trade, 
but not live, nor build residences.  
Since Chinese merchants were forbidden by law to trade with the Japanese, Portugal 
became the key intermediary in these exchanges by the 1550s. This trade was highly 
lucrative not only to merchants, but to the mandarinal authorities. Thus in 1557 
Portuguese were allowed to reside in Macau on a permanent basis. It can be said for 
certain that Portugal did not conquer this plot of land, it was authorized to stay with a 
degree of autonomy at the volition of the local authorities. There’s also the theory that 
because the area was frequently raided by pirates who would sometimes go up the river 
to Canton and cause destruction and instability, the settlement and naval expertise of the 
Portuguese in Macau was a way to ward off the pirates, protect the territories from their 
raids, and, at the same time, reap the benefits of the Japanese trade. 
Even though the Portuguese authorities administrated the territory and made 
decisions regarding its safety such as building defensive walls and administrating some 
justice (Portuguese on Portuguese disputes), its mandate was limited and from 1573 the 
Portuguese started paying an annuity to the imperial treasure or ground rent. This was not 
interpreted by the Portuguese authorities as Tribute and according to Fok - renowed 
Chinese historian - even thou “Portuguese presence on the isthmus was the subject of a 
fierce debate among Ming Mandarins”15, “the Portuguese were never recognized as a 
vassal of the Ming, no Portuguese was ever received by the Son of Heaven, and no tribute 
was sent by the Portuguese of Macau to Beijing. They thus remained outside the formal 
Chinese system of tributary relationships.”16 
 Also, in 1573 with the erection of the ‘Porta do Cerco’, a physical border between 
Macau and China, the territory became completely dependent on China. Portuguese 
needed permission to cross the border and Portuguese ships were not allowed to go up 
the river to Canton. Macau’s survival depended on the produce of Chinese farmers and 
                                                                
15 Fok in Geoffrey C. Gunn, Encountering Macau – A Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 
1557-1999 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 17. 
16 Geoffrey C. Gunn, Encountering Macau – A Portuguese City-State on the Periphery of China, 1557-
1999 (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2016), 18. 
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as such, China could easily starve the territory. Basically, Portuguese authority was at the 
discretion of the Cantonese authorities. Despite Beijing being the political center of the 
country, territories had ample autonomy. Macau was far from Beijing and the Imperial 
commissaries did not visit the territory which meant the Ming authorities had their 
information regarding Macau filtered by the local Cantonese mandarins who often had 
conflicts of interests with Macau. 
At the time foreign delegations were not allowed to stay in Beijing and the only way 
Portuguese could communicate with Beijing directly was through periodic embassies sent 
to the capital. Traditionally these embassies were from tributary states, so it was a long 
and arduous process to obtain authorization to travel to Beijing under the banner of “jinhe” 
“Congratulatory Mission” instead of ‘jingong’ “Tributary Mission”. Cultural differences, 
language barriers, and the protocol itself made the process extremely lengthy and 
expensive.  
After the failed Tomé Pires embassy Portugal sent three more embassies. Jesuit 
priests, who where in Beijing due to their scientific expertise in mechanics and astronomy, 
were of great help for the success of these three missions, translating documents, letters, 
and above all explaining protocol. 
From the 1540s to 1638 trade between Japan and Macau brought the city to life, 
fortunes were made, and the city grew within its limits. The entrance of other European 
powers, namely the Dutch and British, in the Japanese trade had eroded Macau’s position, 
but not destroyed it. That would change with the expulsion of the Portuguese from Japan 
in 1639 when the Shogun fearful of Christianity and foreign infiltration initiated a policy 
of closed country ‘Sankoku’ that would last until 1853.  
Macanese fate was linked to the continent and the dynastic transition impacted Macau 
heavily. After the collapse of the Ming dynasty in 1644 the Qing established what would 
become the last Chinese dynasty and would last 276 years. The fight for power between 
the Qing and Southern Ming caused terrible strain in Macau. In the 1640s famine plagued 
continental China and a wave of refugees sought protection in Macau.  
Zheng Zhilong, a skilled pirate from Fukien baptized in Macau as Nicholas Iquan 
Gaspard, fought the Qing before defecting, but his son known as Koxinga, kept his 
father’s war against the central power. The Southern Ming were eventually defeated but 
their actions were extremely disruptive and in 1661 with the objective of cutting 
Koxinga’s sources of aid and supplies in the south, the Qing enforced a sea ban ordering 
coastal residents from several districts to abandon the littoral. All maritime commerce 
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was forbidden, boundary markers were erected, and trespassers had to face severe 
punishments including the death penalty. In 1662 after the order reached Macau Chinese 
abandoned the city and even though Portuguese could reside in the city they were 
forbidden from sailing. Given that Macau lived of sea commerce this decree would 
asphyxiate the territory and lead to its starvation. At the time the ‘Leal Senado’ suggested 
an Embassy to Beijing. It came to fruition and it lasted three years from 1667 to 1670 
with the objective of saving Macau’s status as a commercial port, but also to hinder the 
Dutch Embassy (1666-1668) from obtaining privileges that would conflict with 
Portuguese interests. Headed by Manuel Saldanha the mission was a success. Advised by 
missionaries who instructed the mission in matters such as protocol, the topic of Macau 
was never brought up, but the representatives played their part and gained the favor of the 
Court.  
Obviously, Macau was not the only coastal territory highly affected by the ban and 
local Guangdong officials requested its lift in 1669 which was granted and the population 
allowed back. 
With the lost of the Japanese trade, Macau’s golden years were over. In 1685 the 
situation aggravated further when Macau lost the monopoly of China’s external trade with 
the opening of Guangzhou port to foreigners at a time when British and Dutch were 
eclipsing Portuguese merchants. The year 1688 contributed to the impoverishment of the 
territory with the implementation of the ‘hoppu’ - Chinese customs house - implemented 
to control the access of foreign ships to the Delta River axing Portuguese tax revenues by 
exclusively collecting from both Chinese and foreign ships.  
China was opening itself to foreign trade – with the ‘Thirteen Factories’ settlement – 
but not to foreign infiltration. Foreigners were allowed to conduct business and maintain 
warehouses and trading posts along the Pearl River but were not allowed to hold residency 
(until 1760) and consequently these merchants lived in Macau most of the year making 
arrangements for the trade fairs to come. In the late 17th century and until mid 18th century 
these residents and their business helped keep Macau afloat. Additionally, Macau turned 
to the intra-Asia market solidifying other routes such as Macau – Vietnam, Macau – 
Macassar, Macau – Timor, Macassar – Flores – Solor – Timor, often connecting to Goa 
and Lisbon as well.  
Faced with dwindling profits and weaken position of Macau the mandarins tighten 
their authority in the territory: in 1736 a mandarin delegate - ‘tso tang’ - starts residing in 
Macau and in 1749 imposed the new Penal System virtually abolishing the double 
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jurisdiction system and forcing Macau into the Chinese jurisdiction system (with the 
exception of minor disputes between Portuguese). 
An example of Chinese authority more specifically hoppu’s power is the dismissal 
of Telles de Menezes who in 1747 became Governor of Macau. After destroying a 
stakewall that had been built by the hoppu beyond the approved limits, the Leal Senado 
forced him to pay for its reconstruction and apologize. Additionally, he refused to 
surrender to Chinese authorities two Portuguese citizens accused of the assassination of 
two Chinese vagrants and eventually repatriated them to Timor. Chinese authorities filled 
a formal complaint with Goa (at the time the head of the all Portuguese territories in Asia), 
Goa had to pay a bribe and Telles was forced to return to Goa after a myriad of public 
humiliations.17  
To soften the impact of the new Penal Code an Embassy headed by Francisco de 
Assis Pacheco de Sampaio was sent in 1752. Despite it being considered a success the 
missionaries could not be of help because since 1724 they were exiled in Canton - with 
some exceptions, namely scientists - but when in 1762 the Jesuits were expelled from 
Macau by the Portuguese King, the missionary cooperation link between Macau and 
Beijing was severed.18   
In fact, being considered a success simply meant that the Embassy had been received, 
it had properly followed the rules, and the Court was not displeased with the Emissaries. 
In terms of results, Macau’s position remained the same and the animosity between 
Macau’s and Cantonese authorities was never tackled despite the months spent by 
emissaries in Canton while obtaining permission to continue19.  
Entering the 19th century the demands of the tso-tang became more and more 
unreasonable to the Portuguese and - due more to Portuguese internal politics than the 
situation in Macau - in a unilateral decision, the new Portuguese Constitution of 1822 
enshrined Macau as an integral part of Portugal colonial system: 
                                                                
17 Calvet de Magalhães, Macau e a China no Apos Guerra (Macau: Instituto Portugues do Oriente, 1992): 
6, and Zhidong Hao, Macau History and Society (Hong Kong: Hong Kong University Press, 2011): 37. 
18  As previously mentioned, Portugal sent four Embassies to Beijing. The third one was headed by 
Alexandre Metello de Sousa e Menezes and Father António de Magalhães in 1726 this time with the intent 
of defending Christianity in China after the ban of Christian missions in 1721 and the proscription of 
Catholicism in 1724. 
19 Calvet de Magalhães, Macau e a China no Apos Guerra (Macau: Instituto Portugues do Oriente, 1992): 
7. 
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“ARTICLE 20º — The Portuguese Nation is constituted by the union of all Portuguese 
from both hemispheres. Its territory shapes the United Kingdom of Portugal, Brazil, and 
Algarves and comprehends:  
(...) 
IV — In Asia, Salsete, Bardez, Goa, Diu, and the Macau territories and the Solor Islands 
and Timor.”20 
The next step of integration of Macau in the Portuguese colonial system happened in 
1844 with the Decree of September 20 that elevated the status of Macau which until then 
had been administrated under the Vice Roy of the Portuguese India. Macau became the 
head of a new province (Macau, Timor, and Solor) and consequently had to answer 
directly to Lisbon.  
The British had obtained the rights to Hong Kong in 1842, Portugal was struggling 
to compete and frustrated that its historical position in the territory was overshadowed by 
British power. A long diplomatic battle for the recognition of Portuguese sovereignty 
began. 
After the First Opium War, Portugal made the best use of Chinese weaken position 
and in 1846 following Lisbon’s directives Governor Ferreira do Amaral stopped paying 
ground rent, closed the Chinese customs (hoppu) declaring the territory a free port, 
refused Chinese jurisdiction, and imposed taxes on the Chinese population. The ‘Leal 
Senado’ (governmental assembly) did not approve of his actions so the Governor 
dissolved it. China was too weak to answer institutionally, but the locals killed the 
Governor in 1849 making him the only Portuguese Governor to be killed as a reaction to 
implemented policies. The political instability at the time kept the crisis from escalating 
further and China struggled to regain its previous administrative power.  
The political chaos of the 19th century in China changed the political landscape 
drastically. After the Opium Wars, Boxer War, and Treaties of Tientsin (issues in which 
Portugal declared neutrality) permanent embassies were allowed and Macau did not have 
to rely on the Cantonese authorities to communicate with the central power anymore. 
Due to its size, Portugal did not conclude a “Commerce and Friendship Agreement” 
with China in 1858 like the big powers and it would have to wait until 1887 to do so. The 
Governor of Macau Isidoro Francisco Guimarães was responsible for the negotiations and 
was ordered to use the domestic and international conditions, that is, the fragility of the 
                                                                
20 Jorge Miranda, As Constituições Portuguesas: de 1822 ao Texto Actual da Constituição (Lisbon: Livraria 
Petrony, 1984): 23-24. 
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Chinese state, to negotiate an agreement that unequivocally stated Portuguese sovereignty 
over Macau. Not as a lease, but as part of its colonial system. 
A treaty that recognized said premise was signed in August 13, 1862, but the Chinese 
negotiators changed their stance and ultimately did not ratify it.  
The frustration accumulated but the regional context was favorable to Portugal: (1) 
in 1886 in order to increase its revenue, China increased opium import tax and to collect 
it needed both Hong Kong and Macau’s effort to control contraband21; (2) rumors that 
Portugal was considering ceding Macau to France (with whom China was fighting a war 
1884-1885) encouraged China to the negotiating table. In March 26, 1887 a protocol was 
signed by the Minister of Portugal Barros Gomes and the Superior Officer of the Chinese 
Imperial Maritime Customs Service James Duncan Campbell. 
 
Protocol: 
“Article I. A Treaty of friendship and commerce with the most favoured nation clause 
will be concluded and signed at Peking. 
Article II. China confirms perpetual occupation and government of Macao and its 
dependencies by Portugal, as any other Portuguese possession. 
Article III. Portugal engages never to alienate Macao and its dependencies without 
agreement with China. 
Article IV. Portugal engages to co-operate in opium revenue work at Macao in the same 
way as England at Hong Kong.” 
 
The treaty of Commerce and Friendship was signed in Beijing on December 1, 1887 
by Thomás de Sousa Rosa, Prince Ch’ing and Minister of Public Works Sun.22 
“Art II: China confirms in its entirety the second article of the Protocol of Lisbon, relating 
to the perpetual occupation and government of Macao by Portugal. 
It is stipulated that Commissioners appointed by both Governments shall proceed to 
the delimitation of the boundaries, which shall be determined by a special convention; 
but so long as the delimitation of the boundaries is not concluded, everything in respect 
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to them shall continue as at present, without addition, diminution, or alteration by either 
of the parties.” 
The Treaty was ratified in 1888, but the delimitation of boundaries was never 
conducted which would lead to a diplomatic crisis also involving the Japanese military 
during the Second World War. 
According to Calvet de Magalhães, renowned Portuguese diplomat and Consul in 
Canton from 1946 it is clear that: “The Portuguese were tolerated as long as they were 
not a threat to China and as long as its presence was convenient. If we take a look at the 
negotiations of the 1887 protocol we can see that during the negotiations the Imperial 
Government never admitted the possibility of a hand over of Macau, allowing only the 
recognition of a administrative territory or a free perpetual lease. .” . (...) Thus, to the 
Chinese Macau continued to be, as always, Chinese territory under Portuguese 
administration.” 23  
In 1888, the Portuguese Consulate in Canton is inaugurated. Located in Shamian 
Island, at the time a concession divided between Britain and France, it proved to be an 
excellent post for commercial purposes and, especially during the Second Sino-Japanese 
War, an important intelligence collecting center. The Portuguese Consulate in Canton was 
under the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, while Macau, due to its status, was under the 
Ministry of Colonies. According to Calvet the Magalhães 24  there was little to no 
cooperation between these two posts and no efforts to coordinate a policy for Macau even 
though the Consul in Canton Vasco Martins Morgado (1933-1939) periodically sent 
reports to Lisbon with suggestions regarding Macau’s course of action. 
Regarding the economy, Macau already lackluster economy had to compete with 
other powers after the Opium war and the opening of multiple ports to foreign trade. 
Additionally, with the establishment of Hong Kong in 1842, British dominated sea trade.  
Macau’s 19th century economy relied on opium, the spice trade from Calcutta, gambling, 
and the coolie trade, mostly indentured laborers, shipped to California, Cuba, and Peru. 
The coolie trade was practiced from several ports but in the mid 19th century both local 
and international pressure mounted urging these countries for greater regulation, but 
abuses persisted and “Domestically, the trade fed corruption in Macau while adding only 
marginally to the commercial improvement and prosperity of the colony.” Furthermore it 
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“damaged the good name of Portugal and strained relations with China.”25 The trade was 
banned in 1873. 
Late 19th century Macau had industry too: tea factories, tobacco factories, traditional 
crafts industries such as matches, incense, and firecrackers, and fishing. There was also 
an investment in infrastructure in the late 19th century and 20th century made possible by 
the profitable opium and gambling monopolies.   
 
Macau in the 20th century 
The political upheaval of 19th century China would continue into the 20th century and 
was of great interest for the European powers especially those with a stake in Asia. 
Guangzhou or Canton had long been a flourishing city, not just for domestic trade 
but international trade, as one of the stops of the maritime lines of the Silk Road. It 
retained the monopoly of foreign trade up until the Treaty of Nanking in 1842, signed 
after the first Opium War and the first of many unequal treaties, when China was forced 
to open several ports to foreign trade. Guangzhou was the center of diplomatic activity 
and during the period that preceded the war an important source of information.  
Vasco Martins Morgado, the Portuguese Consul General in Canton from 1933 to 
1939 (when the city fell to the Japanese army and foreign legations left) wrote important 
reports dating from February 1938 to May 1939 to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in 
Lisbon describing the political situation, war developments, and assessing the risks to 
Portuguese Macau only eight hours away.26  
Portuguese interests in the Pacific area had been internationally recognized in 1922 
in the Nine Power Treaty in which Portugal was one of the signatory nations. 
One of Portugal’s foreign policy priorities was to maintain its colonial Empire. In the 
advent of the new Portuguese regime in the 1930’s the policy of official neutrality was 
formulated. In accordance with the principle of neutrality – and at a stage when it was 
impossible to tell the outcome of the conflict – in 1932 Portugal refuses to recognize the 
puppet state of Manchukuo. The League of Nations would do the same in 1933 and 
consequently Japan left the organization. 
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The signatories of the Nine Power Treaty would convene again at the Brussels 
Conference in November 1937 to discuss peaceful means to end the Sino-Japanese 
conflict. Salazar’s instructions to the Portuguese head of negotiations Dr. Augusto de 
Castro could not have been clearer:  
“Portuguese policy regarding the conflict in the Extreme Orient has been and shall 
continue to be of complete neutrality. Such as been said by the Government of Macau 
and this policy has been communicated to Britain. Our stance at the meeting that you 
preside over should be to favor everything of conciliatory nature and avoid and be protest 
every thing that aggravate one of the parts...”.27 
In reality, juggling the interests of the several actors was complex and sometimes out 
of the control of Portuguese authorities. Macau, due to its location, had long been a haven 
to revolutionaries and refugees alike. In the 1930s there was an influx of people from 
different backgrounds and nationalities. Macau became an espionage center, just like 
many other neutral territories, where Japanese agents and Chinese nationalists often 
attacked each other. In a city bursting through its seams, a mix of lack of personnel and 
incompetence of the local police force, a non-resolved issue could easily be perceived as 
taking one’s side. These exogenous factors were difficult to control and often the 
authorities had to rely on the good relations cultivated over the years with their foreign 
counterparts which was in itself tricky not only because there were several Chinese 
factions with different interests, but the Japanese power structure was intricate to navigate. 
On one hand there was an effort to build a relationship with the Japanese Consuls and 
even when there was mistrust there was respect for the diplomatic institution. Now the 
traditional channels of diplomatic communication were losing its importance. Military 
authorities and civil authorities struggled to find common ground and negotiations with 
civil authorities would be completely ignored. On his report dated February 23, 1938 
Vasco Martins Morgado states: “Some observations and confidential information, allows 
us to affirm: the Japanese Government does not control its military; the Army is in 
Charge; the people and the soldiers do not want war, obey blindly, guided by patriotic 
sentiments, but with no enthusiasm. ”28 
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The Islands  
If juggling the interests of several actors was a delicate task, the stakes were even 
higher when there was a clear conflict between Portuguese interests and Japanese interests. 
The Japanese military presented itself as the savior of the people who where under 
European rule. A liberator of the Asian people. According to that thesis, Portuguese 
colonizers were to be removed. But more pressing that the ultimate Japanese vision of 
Asia, were the immediate strategic needs of Japan, namely access to the territories 
circumventing Macau that, as we have seen, were disputed by Portugal and China. 
Macau’s situation worsened in 1937 with the advancement of Japanese forces in 
South China. The Japanese strategy in China required the asphyxiation of the Chinese 
combatants, both military and militia, thus the blockade of the Yangtze River, but Hong 
Kong and the Indochina continued to facilitate the supply of the nationalists. Macau, on 
the other hand, was in a different position. Its neutrality status required some degree of 
cooperation regarding contraband. 
In September of 1937 Chinese started building defensive positions, namely trenches, 
in the east side of Lapa Island. The diplomatic communications show that Portugal 
perceived these actions as an occupation29. One of Salazar’s main concerns was that this 
change of status quo could be thought as a result of an agreement with Portugal favoring 
China and perceived as a breach in neutrality leading to the escalation of the situation 
with the involvement of other powers. 30  Salazar contacted the consul in Beijing 
instructing him to make the proper diligence.  
“Every minute we receive worrying news from the colony. Important Chinese forces 
are organizing defenses by Macau fearing the landing of Japanese forces in Macau to 
support other anti-Chine forces. These forces offer the Governor of Macau their help to 
repel the Japanese which has been refused arguing that Portugal has enough forces. On 
the other hand, under the pretext that Chinese were planing to take Macau, Japan offers 
its support to repel them which has equally been refused following the same reasoning”31 
Lisbon feared Japanese could use this alarmist news to commit an act against Portuguese 
sovereignty with the usual assurances of friendship while claiming it to be temporary. 
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Given this agitation, Salazar wanted to avoid misunderstandings and on September 
14, 1937 telegraphs Tokyo asking the Consul to communicate with Japanese authorities 
and request that war ships avoid Macau’s territorial waters given that said presence at the 
time of such convolution in Southern China would be highly inconvenient to Portuguese 
authorities and would stir further mistrust with the Chinese. Concerning this topic Salazar 
also telegraphs London requesting Monteiro to approach the British Government 
regarding possible cooperation between Hong Kong and Macau in case of a serious and 
unpredictable events given that Macau’s safety was also of the British interest.32 The 
Consul in Tokyo, after contacting Japanese Foreign Minister, contacts Lisbon confirming 
Japanese assurances that the Navy would, for the time being, refrain from sending war 
vessels.33 
In late September and early October, Japanese aircrafts overflew Macau and Lapa 
several times and the Portuguese consul in Tokyo, Freitas, filled a formal complaint with 
the Minister of Foreign Affairs who in turn claimed to have no knowledge but after 
consulting the Navy was informed that in fact they had happened non intentionally, but 
because of the small scale of the territory it was extremely difficult for pilots to avoid it.34 
Pressure seemed to be building up, the communications show that both Macau and Lisbon 
were highly alarmed with the escalation of the events and even started talking about 
possible collaboration with Hong Kong to defend the territory.  
On December 11, 1937 there’s the first confirmation on the records regarding 
Japanese intentions. Salazar informs Tokyo that the Portuguese Consul in Hong Kong 
was informed by the Japanese Consul of that city that Japan, in accordance with its 
southern operations, could occupy islands in the vicinity of Macau and Hong Kong, some 
of which were disputed between Portugal and China. Portugal immediately replied that if 
any other nation were to disembark in said island Portugal reserved the right to occupy 
the east part of the island.35   
In December Japanese forces reach Ilha da Montanha and occupy several Chinese 
houses assuring that their mission is to eliminate Chinese nationalists. Their stay was 
short, and Macau’s Governador saw this occasion as an opportunity to send Portuguese 
troops to the island following the old Portuguese policy of taking advantage of Chinese 
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weakness to further their position. Officially the Governador stated that the troops were 
sent with the intent of protecting Portuguese citizens, not to disrespect the status quo with 
China. Nonetheless Chinese protested and the mistrust grew.  
Vasco Martins alerts for the rumors in Canton about Japanese preferential treatment 
of Portuguese ships given that the Portuguese ships seemed to be able to navigate to 
Canton and Hong Kong without being searched by Japanese War ships. According to the 
consul there was widespread doubt regarding Portuguese neutrality.  In turn the belief that 
Portugal’s neutrality was but official translated into an influx of Chinese in Macau where 
they believed would be safe from Japanese attacks and occupation.36 
The consul’s ‘Informação Política nº 2’ dated March 27, 1938 further explores the 
distrust of Portuguese neutral status and offers a suggestion:  
“The continuance in Montanha Island (…) of some Portuguese police officers after the 
retreat of the Japanese reinforces this notion. The reasons presented by the Governor of 
Macau are resourceful, intelligent, patriotic, and timely and can be used to try to explain 
our presence there, but are not enough to qualm that belief. Maybe if we had, before the 
war openly told China that in case of emergency we would occupy the disputed territories 
temporarily until the end of the conflict, not disregarding previous agreements regarding 
the established rights and borders, it would have been a transparent action that would 
have not left the Chinese thinking that we act as a response to Japanese action instead of 
thinking that we are taking advantage of China’s weakness to occupy the territories that 
we long claim as ours.  (...) this justifies and increases, perhaps undeservingly the discredit 
of our friendship with China so often invoked by us ”37 “The doubt that Portugal does not 
share the desire of conquest, started to dissipate only after the arrival of Portuguese war 
vessels and soldiers. This was interpreted by the Chinese as a sign that Japan respects 
Macau because of its defense capabilities and not because of the political ideology that 
links Portugal, Italy, and Germany. It is to stop the Chinese from thinking that we are 
agreeable with the Japanese that I consider of the most convenience the continuation of 
naval forces and soldiers here.”38 
Regarding the occupation of the islands in dispute a secret memorandum was 
negotiated between Portugal and Japan. The first Portuguese draft follows: 
                                                                
36 Vasco Martins Morgado, A Guerra Vista de Cantão (Macau: Instituto Português do Oriente, 1998): 35. 
37 Ibid: 43-44. 
38 Ibid: 45. 
34 
 
“1º If Japan lands any troops in said island they shall be instructed not to go beyond the 
following limits (meridian 113º e 31’ East; south limit of Von-can 22º 6’ 8’’) of the area 
claimed by Portugal 
2º The landing of Japanese troops in Lapa is not advisable due to the proximity of Chinese 
troops to Portugal and Portugal wishes not get involved in the conflict;  
3º If Japan lands forces in said islands Portugal shall formally protest given that, if it 
wouldn’t it could be deduced that Portugal forgave its territorial claims. The protest is a 
diplomatic necessity not a declaration of animosity; 
4º When Japan takes actions upon said territories it shall wan the Portuguese consul in 
Hong Kong ou authorities in Macau so that the appropriate measures can be enacted with 
no delay in Lapa..39” 
In the end, Japan agreed on the first three articles: the Japanese Foreign Minister 
guaranteed that in case of occupation of the islands Japan would, as far as possible, try 
not to offend Portuguese interests and sensibilities, it would accept Portuguese protests 
as a formality, not with animosity, but to protect military secret operations it could not 
inform Portugal beforehand.40 The Memorandum was signed on December 3, 1937 by 
the Portuguese Consul and the Japanese Consul in Hong Kong. 
Regardless, on December 28, the Governor of Macau telegraphs Lisbon informing 
that Japanese troops had landed in the island of Von-Can.41 It was at this time that 
Gorgulho occupied Man Lio Ho (a Chinese village in the ‘portuguese side’ of Montanha). 
The Japanese troops left by the end of January, but would re-occupy the territory in 
on April 24, 1940 
 
The impact of the taking of Canton in Macau 
As previously mentioned with the Japanese progress towards south, Macau’s position 
became vulnerable to Japanese pressure. The cast shadowed over the Portuguese 
neutrality in China led thousands of people to seek refuge in Macau, many of them anti-
Japanese activists. 
According to António de Andrade Silva’s memoirs of his life in Macau during the 
war, in the early stages of the conflict, that is 1937-1939, Macau was full of life. Many of 
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the newcomers, Chinese and foreign alike, were wealthy and the cabarets, the casinos, 
the opium houses were vibrant with this injection of money.42 
In 1938 for Japanese to succeed an effective blockade was imperative. The blockade 
in the Yangtze River did not solve the problem of the contraband and Japan asked for 
Portuguese collaboration in Macau. 
In Macau the objective of the local Japanese authorities was obvious: to show the 
Portuguese authorities the benefits that could be reaped from a conciliatory, collaborative 
relation.  
A strategy of public deference and backstage demands ensued. The public deference 
was meant to strain the relation between China and Portugal with the objective of isolating 
the small isthmus, leaving the territory no other option but to collaborate.   
The consul in Canton reports in May 1938 how this strategy was working 
complaining that Japanese deference towards Portuguese ships was being interpreted as 
complicity. Which translated into resentment in the smallest of things: delay in answering, 
delay in scheduling interviews, and unwillingness to reply the consul’s queries.43 
Japanese authorities would show their discontent accusing Portugal of tacitly 
consenting to the presence and anti-Japanese activities of Chinese troops after a speedboat 
being chased by Japanese authorities hid in Macau.44 And after another incident on May 
28 when a Japanese speedboat was attacked by an automatic rifle from a building in the 
isthmus.45 
The Portuguese Minister in Tokyo vehemently protested the accusation of the 
presence of Chinese troops in the territory, and the complicity of the local authorities 
assuring Tokyo that Portuguese authorities would punish any Chinese citizen that had 
practiced criminal, hostile acts. 
Furthermore, even though Portuguese ships, as we have seen, were allowed to sail 
freely, there were several incidents in which fishing and cargo junks (namely salt) were 
apprehended.46  
The Japanese presence and its power were ever present in Macau and well reported: 
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“In the meantime, Japanese military and naval chiefs have settled peacefully in 
Macau with their aids in plain clothes exerting a discreet vigilance over the anti-japanese 
population, spying on the trade on the port that they suspected, with a certain degree of 
plausibility, was supplying the non occupied China. And sometimes in the muddy water 
surrounding the colony we would seem floating mutilated bodies, without knowing who 
they were or where they came from...”47  
António Silva even admits that Afonso Sequeira (Macau’s Health Inspector) once 
faced with a headless body, Japanese execution style, that drifted ashore decided to order 
its burial attesting that ‘no signs of foul play were detected’ in order to avoid possible 
complications from an official investigation.48 
In November 1938 Japanese authorities made the first official diligence looking to 
develop greater cooperation with Macau. The Japanese Consul in Canton offered 
advantages to Macau making it an intermediary point between South China and the world 
were Japanese vessels would transfer and refuel and therefore a Japanese consular post 
was needed.49 After Japanese authorities blocked the Yangtze river Chinese junks were 
forbidden from trading to mainland China and cutting one of Portugal’s most profitable 
trade routes. This was of great importance given that Japan intended to complicate Hong 
Kong’s dealings. It was becoming clear to Portugal that the age-old alliance with England 
could, in the future, be prejudicial.50 Once again Portugal had to hedge its alliances and 
interests. 
Salazar, following his policy of neutrality, was open to economic investment from 
Axis and Allies alike as long as it respected certain requirements in place to safeguard 
Portugal’s national interest and its autocratic economy: no monopolies were to be created, 
main industries had to be explored by companies owned mainly by Portuguese.51 Overall 
Salazar was wary of Japanese ambitions52 in Asia and believed that if Japan were to win 
the war, all European presence and European trade would end. 
The Japanese objective was to create a quid pro quo relation: in exchange for cooperative 
neutrality, Japan would respect its sovereignty and invest in Macau.  
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In the end of 1938 Japan had taken Guangdong, but as Vasco Martins Morgado notes 
in his reports: “Japan is occupying territories, but it’s still not winning them”53. Vasco 
Martins reports the arrival of the new Japanese General Consul to Canton, Katsuo 
Okazaki, on November 3, 193854, vents his frustration about the new puppet governor 
installed Mr. Lu Chun Yung and the inability to get an answer to his queries adding “I 
have never discerned in my relations with the Japanese in Canton any sense of order or 
intention. There’s always someone unknown to us (…). Thus, the difficulty of getting 
anything at all done. There are always so many people to be consulted, to be involved, 
that we get lost in the mazes of authority.”55 
It is with the intent to better navigate this haze and to improve the relations in Macau 
with the Japanese that on December 29, 1938 Capitan Carlos Gorgulho, Commander of 
the Police in Macau arrives to Canton to meet the Japanese high military authorities 
namely the General in Chief Ando Rikichi.56  
The Japanese priorities can be discerned from their questions: (1) would it be possible 
to send to Macau air navigation services; (2) could Japan use the track field as an 
aerodrome. Gorgulho answered that regarding the air navigation services the MNE should 
be contacted, and that the aerodrome was an English concession, more specifically it 
belonged to Melco (British owned Electricity company). Ando added that it was 
important to reach an agreement concerning economic development in Macau, but more 
interestingly it stated it was important for Portugal to fight communism, his wish that 
would recognize the state of Manchukuo, and cooperate economically with Japan.57 
This was the first encounter between Gorgulho and the Japanese authorities, but not 
the last. In 1939 Gorgulho would head an official visit to Japan. 
 
Captain Gorgulho visit to Japan 
Gorgulho’s visit to Japan took place in February 1939. 
On his report Gorgulho complains about the Japanese mistrust, excess of protocol, 
and the incredibly slow manner of work of the Japanese bureaucratic machine. Refers to 
the visit of the Meiji palace as “one of the biggest plights I’ve been through”.  
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During his visit he met the Minister of War, General Itagaki, the vice Minister of 
Foreign affairs, Mr Sawada, as well as the Minister of the Navy, Admiral Yonai and the 
Vice Admiral Yamamoto; attended four official dinners, and was awarded with the order 
of the Knight of the Rising Sun. 
The Vice Minister of Foreign Affairs told Gorgulho “Please convey to your 
government that the Japanese people have its ambitions defined and will not falter to 
achieve them. The nation supports the Army and the Navy.” 
To be noted is the secret meeting requested in loco by the Minister of War, Itagaki, 
who suggested that “given the friendly relations between Portugal and Japan, the 
Portuguese government could secretly allow the establishment of a Japanese military base 
in the island of Timor where military deposits could be installed.” 58  Immediately 
Gorgulho answered that the query was outside of the scope of his visit and authority. The 
establishment of a Japanese Consulate in the territory was also on the table. 
This visit was of high interest to foreign delegates especially China that had its 
diplomatic services watch it closely. Feeding old Chinese fears, Portuguese delegations 
both in China and the MNE itself had exchanges with Chinese dignitaries to answer its 
queries and dismiss the idea of a secret agreement between the two countries regarding 
Macau’s status quo. The dignitaries were assured Portugal was to maintain its strict 
neutral policy. In fact, Portugal had absolute no intention of neglecting its relationship 
with China. Portugal acknowledged regardless of the outcome of the war, maintain good 
relations with China was a priority.  
During Gorgulho’s visit Japanese newspapers rushed to print stories claiming the 
Portugal was about to recognize the state of Manchukuo and concede privileges to Japan 
in Macau. Portugal’s diplomatic machine worked tirelessly to deny what it considered to 
be incorrect information, reinforcing it was a ‘friendship’ visit, but also stating that a local 
agreement regarding ease of navigation could be on the table.59 
 
The built up for the crisis, 1939 and 1940 
The year of 1939 was a year of exchanges between the two countries and of gradual 
nuisances and insistent requests. 
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Early 1939 Admiral Shegala visits Macau and shows interest in establishing an air 
navigation service such as pan America already had in the territory. The Governor 
welcomed this idea, it wouldn’t create a dangerous precedent, it wouldn’t breach 
neutrality, and according to the Governor the US was neglecting the air service to Macau 
and flying almost exclusively to Hong Kong.  Colonel Imeda would a few months later 
insist on the topic. 
On January 11, 1939 General Ando, accompanied by Colonel Gimuro and Major 
Tanimuro arrive in Macau and suggest60 sending an emissary to Japan to discuss the limits 
of the islands circunventing Macau, Lapa being the most pressing issue. In March 1939, 
Japan takes hold of the territories in Macau’s immediate proximity (Kong Mon), taking 
control of the other side of the border, that is Porta do Cerco and its customs office.  
Tanaka visits Hong Kong and Macau on March 8, 1939 followed by Colonel Ishino 
on May 6. 
The Army Chief of staff, Admiral Sukihara visits Macau in April 22, 1939 to request 
Macau’s assistance to detain two motorized vessels used for contraband that Japanese 
knew belonged to a member of the Macanese administration Lobo, and requesting that 
the Navy could temporarily install a TSF (radio) station for their exclusive use and finally 
to express the wish to capture several boats from the customs services, anchored in the 
interior port of Macau between the Lapa and Macau.61 The Governor ordered Lobo’s 
boats to suspend their services to avoid entanglement in contraband, refused the request 
for radio communications, and finally told Japan it could not reach said boats without 
violating Portuguese territorial waters. In fact, this was a big problem to Portugal, the 
limits of the disputed islands were disputed, but relatively easy to understand (west, east), 
but the territorial waters were much trickier to define.  
Japan used this gray area as an excuse to disrespect Portuguese sovereignty and 
control/inspect/tax boats near Macau often. 
The custom’s boats issue would become a source of diplomatic strain when on May 
8, 1939 a Japanese commissary (not named) told the Portuguese authorities that Japan 
could take them if Portugal refused to surrender them.62 In June Admiral Sukihara himself 
intervenes and asking the governor to surrender the boats to avoid violence and to avoid 
“causing Portugal any embarrassment”.63 
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From May there are reports that the situation is worsening, the Japanese started 
imposing difficulties that um until that point didn’t exist.64 
On May 6, 1939 the Minister of Colonies complains to Salazar that “the military 
authorities don’t pay any attention to what the civil authorities have to say and the 
Minister of Japan in Lisbon can only deal with the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs 
which does not directly deal with the military authorities.”65 
Another frequent topic of conversation between the Canton – Macau – Japanese 
authorities was the end of the Yangtze river blockade. Essential for Macau’s survival that 
now relied heavily on Hong Kong. After the taking of Hong Kong the French Treaty Port 
of Guangzhouwan became Macau’s lifeline and that too controlled by the Japanese 
furthering Japanese grip on the supply of the island. 
On September 13, 1939 yet another request for cooperation this time issued by 
Captain Higo and Lieutenant Oka: (1) help stop Chinese newspapers anti Wang Jingwei 
(head of the Japanese Empire controlled state puppet in Eastern China), (2) the presence 
of ‘terrorists’ coming from Hong Kong, (3) protect pro-Japanese Chinese from Chiang 
Kai-Shek supporters. 
To which the Governor answered: (1) Macau’s censorship commission forbids the 
publication of a great number of articles that that be prejudicial to the relationship 
between Portugal and Japan, but it was difficult to control the pamphlets dropped by air; 
(2) Macau’s secret services in cooperation with Hong Kong and Canton have repatriated 
several Chinese that failed to be vetted; (3) Macau has proven to be strict in this regard 
and severely punishes such acts.66 
In early 1940 the Japanese Consul in Lisbon has a meeting with Salazar in which he 
shows interest in further developing the relations between the countries in Macau and 
Timor and in order to substantiate such desire Japan had just sent the former business 
liaison Charge of Affairs - about whom Salazar said “person that was impatient and 
sometimes impertinent, going beyond the instructions of his own government”67 - in 
Lisbon to Macau to study possible venues of cooperation. His choice of words (according 
to Salazar’s notes) are quite interesting: “Japan has been working towards that goal, 
having the authorities in China deal with the Government of Macau to facilitate supply 
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lanes and trade with the neighboring regions, such as Canton.” 68  The undertone 
emphasizes a power relation: Japan allows Macau to procure goods in China. Japan is in 
control of the supply lanes. 
After his stop in Macau the former ‘Charge of Affairs’ visits Tokyo where he has a 
meeting with the Portuguese Minister and leaves a warning: “the Japanese Government 
has decided to pressure Macau to obtain at all costs to obtain oil concession in Timor. 
The Japanese Government and the military and navy authorities wish to obtain at all costs 
oil of a colony from a country that would not eventually impose an embargo to exports. 
The military authorities were impatient and want to go through with the strangulation of 
Macau.(…) Adding that the recent oil concessions to the British had caused a terrible 
impression with is government given that the ones Japan had received were sterile.”69  
Days before, the Japanese Minister in Lisbon in a meeting with Salazar had made had 
insistently asked for collaboration in Timor. 
This marks a new stage in the relations when Japan clearly states its intentions 
towards Macau, making a clear connection between Macau and Timor. 
Ever since the beginning of the year military maneuvers by the forces of Wang 
Jingwei in the proximity of Lapa had been taking place pressuring Macau and 
encumbering relations. By the end of March, and after the diplomatic demarches in the 
first half of the month, Salazar orders Esteves Fernandes in Tokyo to make diligence in 
order to obtain an agreement recognizing the Portuguese part of Lapa – just like Japan 
had done concerning Montanha – with a special directive “it is advisable not let them 
know that we connect what is going on in Macau with Japanese pretensions in Timor if, 
however, if so is officially stated, you should appear surprised and convey that it does not 
seem coherent with the friendly relation always affirmed by Japan and has been taken 
into account in our dealings regarding Timor.” 70 The next day Salazar telegraphs London 
and reinforces this idea: “Our position is always to try to untie the situation in Macau and 
the issues of Timor while trying to amicably please Japan somehow in Timor to avoid 
pressure that can be put on us in Macau under 1000 pretexts derived from the conflict in 
China.”71 
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In March the Lapa situation seemed to had been resolved: Portugal pointed out the 
Memorandum of 1937 after being requested to leave Lapa all together and according to 
Salazar “[the Japanese] seemed to believe in our good faith and deferred the resolution of 
the issue, allowing Portuguese troops’ presence in the claimed territory72, but on April 8, 
Esteves Fernandes reports from Tokyo after a meeting at the Ministry in which the general 
director said the Ministry had no knowledge about the Memorandum of 1937, that the 
Lapa issue was to be solved locally with the authorities in Hong Kong or Canton further 
more dismissing the importance of the issue. Is final remark shows how little the 
Portuguese Minister could achieve in Tokyo: “I’m convinced that this Ministry will do 
nothing useful to us. It wants to be granted the concession but has no interest nor means 
to remedy the situation in Macau.”73 In fact just four days later, on the 12th, the Japanese 
Ministry of Foreign Affairs informs Esteves Fernandes, that it would not deal with such 
topic at all.74 
The immense number of actors at play made negotiations lengthily and in 1940, 
according to a report, Macau had to maintain relations with six authorities: (1) Japanese 
Navy, (2) Japanese Army, (3) Japanese Deployment Command Japonês in Chin san, (4) 
Governor of the Chong san district, (5) General Comander of the Chinese Pacification 
Forces, and (6) Commander of the Chinese Forces in Lapa and Chin san.75  
On May 1, Salazar telegraphs Tokyo to inform the Minister about the latest 
developments regarding Lapa: in 1937 when Japanese forces occupied part of the island, 
Macau sent a police force battalion to secure what claimed as its territory. These forces 
stayed for years and the acceptance of their presence combined with the Memorandum of 
1937 about Montanha was interpreted as a tacit acceptance of Portuguese sovereignty 
over that part of the island. In March the Japanese military asked the police force to leave, 
but the situation seemed to have been solved, but on May 1st the Portuguese forces were, 
without due cause, attacked by Chinese military and civilians, believed to be instigated 
by Japanese since the group hoisted the Japanese flag. The Portuguese forces left the 
island following obeying instructions to not resist to a degree that could drag the 
Portuguese and Japanese governments.76 In Tokyo Esteves Fernandes promptly notified 
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the authorities the retreat did not mean the abandonment of sovereignty claims adding 
that the timing of the incident, coinciding with the negotiations in Timor, is certain to 
hamper the continuation of the talks.77  
Salazar, always fearful of being accused of breaching neutrality, telegraphs 
Washington May 11: “The British government announced a few days ago the decision to 
send on May 28 a War Vessel to Macau. In the current state of affairs in the extreme 
orient it would be interesting if the Government of the USA were to send a vessel on the 
same day. We cannot make an official diligence on this matter, but you may, in a personal 
capacity and initiative, allude to this visit and insinuate the presence of an American 
vessel.”78 This would not meet consubstantiation. 
In July, Japanese newspapers report that the Navy is seriously alarmed by the 
considerable increase of munitions and other material to China through Hong-Kong, 
Kung Chovwang, and Macau. This news report, obviously approved by the military 
censorship, led Esteves Fernandes to comment: “I’m afraid this is in preparation of a 
maneuver against countries with possessions in China.” 79 In fact, on September 12 
Japanese forces close their grip in of Lapa, occupying the disputed areas, setting artillery 
- some directed at Macau - and imposing the payment of transit taxes to Macau.80 
According to the Minister in Tokyo81 Japanese forces actions were driven by strategic 
goals and do avoid contraband of oil and other items from Macau and surrounding areas 
to the enemy’s territory. The General Director of the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs 
took the opportunity to reiterate the need to obtain the oil concessions in Timor and to 
allow the prospection of copper and zinc, and finally the need for expediency in regard to 
the air service from Timor to Palau.  The General Director of Asia also spoke with Esteves 
Fernades stating the priority was to control the re-exportation of goods to China asking 
Portugal not to support Japanese enemies; asking the Portuguese authorities in Macau to 
pressure the Chinese authorities in the Lapa’s custom services to accept a Japanese 
director and to forbid the printing of articles against the Government in Nanquim.  
Salazar was starting to grow weary of the ‘double speak’ of the Japanese authorities: 
“The actions of the military authorities contradict the successive friendly declarations 
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from the Japanese government and its actions are not facilitating the favorable resolution 
of their pretensions in Macau and in Timor. We have been trying, as far as possible, to 
satisfy Japanese interests, harmonizing them it our own, but the utterances and promises 
of that government frequently shifted to threats or actions incompatible with the principle 
of amicable cooperation.”82  
On September 27, 1940 Japan joins the Axis, becoming entangled in the world theater 
at least to a certain degree. 
In late October, the Portuguese Governor of Macau Artur Tamagnini Barbosa dies in 
office and Gabriel Maurício Teixeira is appointed as the new Governor. 
 
The 1941 crisis 
There is an absence of diplomatic documents and telegraphic exchanges regarding 
Macau during the first half of 1941. Firstly, the diplomatic efforts were being directed to 
the Timor negotiations; secondly, Japan nominated its vice consul to Macau Fukui 
Yasumitsu on April 20, but he arrived at the territory to take office a few months later, 
mid 1941. Thirdly, the new Governor Gabriel Maurício Teixeira was facing serious 
domestic difficulties: overpopulation due to refugees, brutal inflation, and a cholera 
epidemic. Lastly, Japan was entangled in Indochina and would soon face the American 
oil and gasoline embargo. 
On June 21, 1941, Portugal suffers the first big loud action against a Portuguese 
vessel, the seizure of the Portuguese flagged ship ‘Guia’. This event was the prelude of 
things to come. 
On August 27, 1941, Consul Fukui issued the Governor an Ultimatum threatening 
Macau’s food supply. The demands of the Ultimatum (see appendix) were not new: (1) 
stop contraband/smuggling and the use of Macau’s territorial waters to supply resistance 
in China; (2) not allow anti-Japanese forces to operate in the territory (refers particularly 
to pro-Chongqing organizations); (3) ban anti-Japanese press, publications, and 
propaganda; were the main demands. As this was an ultimatum, Portugal was given 
eleven days to comply or face sanctions that would effectively starve the island.  
Macau, overly populated and with its regular supply chains severely impacted by the 
conflict, was facing galloping inflation, abject poverty (mostly Chinese refugees) and a 
blockade would certainly bring about a wave of discontent that the flimsy Portuguese 
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forces would not be able to control. Starvation was not the Governor’s sole fear, social 
and political instability could lead to a breach of neutrality with dire consequences for the 
isthmus status quo. 
The agreement demanded more than just the compliance and control of the 
Portuguese authorities, it also demand ample rights to the Japanese military authorities in 
the territory and in its water namely such as disclosing shipping registries and cargo 
manifestos, the ban of maritime activities, and the right to use premises in Macau (without 
specifying its purpose or leadership). 
Despite having accepted the ultimatum, diplomatic communication between the 
Governor and the Minister of Colonies prove that the Governor refused to accept all of 
Japanese demands trying to eliminate, or at least soften the official version to the point 
where it wouldn’t offend Portuguese dignity. The Governor telegraphs the Minister 
saying that he was inflexible in his refusal to provide cargo manifestos of foreign vessels 
and to give freedom of circulation to Japanese vessels and man in Macanese territorial 
waters on the basis that doing so would constitute economic espionage.  
Telegraphic communications also show that the Governor believed that the 
smuggling accusations were an exaggeration. The police had, in fact, recently 
apprehended gasoline on three occasions which was absolutely inevitable and also proof 
of the Japanese blockade inefficiency. Adding that “I can assure you that I’ve been 
fulfilling in strict compliance the duties of the most rigid and impartial neutrality and the 
only complaint the Japanese might have is that certain liberties that had become common 
place in Macau had been halted since they were not only offensive to our neutrality, but 
disrespectful of our laws.” 83 
The Ultimatum was accepted by the Governor on September 5th and the Maurício 
Teixeira summarizes the agreement in the following terms:  
- Suspend the trade by junks; 
- The fight against smuggling to be headed by the Port Authority and the creation 
of a brigade with the sole purpose of fighting this crime; 
- To grant open carry arm permits to six Japanese informants with the objective of 
fighting contraband;  
- To provide Japanese authorities a copy of the vessels registered with the Port 
Authorities; 
                                                                
83 Telegram n. (not readable), from the Governor of Macau to the Minister of Colonies. September 3, 1941. 
46 
 
- To forbid the navigation during the night of speedboats; 
- To allow the connecting officer the private possession of two vessels registered 
with the Port Authority and given their private status could not hoist a Japanese flag nor 
carry out inspections or policing activities. 
 
The suppression of junk trade was supposed to be temporary, but according to the 
Governor gave the colony some moral leeway to negotiate issues regarding the supply of 
foodstuff. That is, arguing that the suppression of trade junks would be a massive blow 
to the local economy, Macau would agree with its temporary suppression in order to stop 
smuggling and at great personal cost. This was perceived by the Governor as a ‘strong 
moral position’ for future negotiations. When, in reality, the lost was but apparent since, 
according to the Governor, the ‘mechanic of contraband’ would just adapt, specially 
taking in consideration pro-Japanese individuals and Japanese individuals themselves 
were highly involved in the trade. 
Regarding the arm permits and the new brigade the Governor confesses to have had 
no objections since he believed the Japanese claim was true namely that to some extent 
the port authority was complicit with contraband.84   
The special brigade was constituted by five Chinese citizens selected by the Japanese 
and were admitted to the regular Macanese police force as Chinese aids and later assigned 
to the Port Authority exclusively under the hierarchy of the Portuguese police force.  
As for the informants were non-uniformed and were not authorized to perform any 
acts other than obtain and pass along information.  
On September 10, 1941, five days after the acceptance of the ultimatum, a Japanese 
patrol boat shoots a Portuguese patrol boat in Portuguese territorial waters in Macau 
following several incidents in August when Japanese boats tried to inspect and tax ships 
in Portuguese waters.85 The Gaimusho would answer in the following terms: “… no 
Japanese naval vessel has attacked boats belonging to the Macau government. 
 However, the report adds to say, as the naval patrol unit based on Ma Lao Chau 
fired some warning shots at smuggling junks operating in its vicinity, a few stray bullets 
may have fallen near Portuguese patrol boats (…) as long as the Macau Government 
continue their effective cooperation in preventing the smuggling which they have recently 
been rendering, the need for resorting to forcible measures by the Japanese Navy will not 
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arise, and consequently, untoward incidents such as now being complained of will not 
recur in the future.”86 Salazar considers this answer being “the usual threats” further 
stating that Macau has to be best of its ability been fighting contraband.87 
During this complex time, the Governor telegraphs Lisbon a personal exasperation: 
“this is how the Governor of Macau spends most of his time: putting up with Japanese.”88 
On October 13, 1941 Portugal and Japan sign an agreement regarding a Palau-Dili 
air service (see the following chapter). Rapidly international news agencies speculated 
that Japan had threatened Macau to obtain said agreement, but despite the pressures, the 
agreement was identical to a air service agreement signed with Australia and it was not 
exclusive, nor political in any way. Salazar states: “It is false that the Japanese pressured 
Macau to obtain the signature of the agreement. Nonetheless the situation of Macau and 
the political atmosphere in the extreme orient can’t be ignored by us in our dealings with 
Japan.”89 
On October 4, 1941, yet another incident that should have been solved by the agreed 
upon articles of the ultimatum, namely the one regarding the Portuguese territorial waters, 
but it was not.  
A motor boat (Ozuma maru) registered at the harbor office under the name of 
Commander Taijiri carried out a strict inspection of Chinese boats which constituted a 
“flagrant violation of the undertaking given to Macau government by commander Taijiri 
to the effect that the boat registered under his name would never exercise any inspection 
or take any police action, in territorial waters of Macau, as such measures are of the 
exclusive initiative of the Portuguese Authorities.” Adding that through the exclusive 
action of the Portuguese authorities the contraband has been successfully suppressed.90 
 
The incident of ‘Porta do Cerco’ 
Given that ‘Porta do Cerco’ was the border line between China and Macau, it had 
been throughout history the site of several incident of various degrees of seriousness.  
On September 24, 1941 Japanese military accompanied by civilians armed with a 
machine gun and riffles had taken positions by the border. In order to understand the 
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standout, Captain-Major José Joaquim da Silva e Costa, head of administrative services, 
went to the site where he was informed that a woman tried to take to san Chong four tins 
of peanut oil which was not allowed given that she did not possessed a license to export. 
Later a Chinese citizen told a Portuguese border officer that if the woman was not allowed 
to take the tins the Japanese would take them by force. That same man left and shortly 
after came back accompanied by Japanese forces demanding the oil. The Portuguese 
sergeant in charge decided to close the border and to call the Governor’s office to avoid 
the escalation of the incident. The Japanese military authorities sent someone too and it 
was this person, an unnamed Sawa envoy, who talked to the Japanese officers who 
eventually left. Sawa’s envoy at the time told José Joaquim da Silva e Costa that there 
had been a misunderstanding.91 
The Governor’s official protests with Consul Fukui show that Portugal may have 
accepted the Ultimatum, but it was not fully compliant to Japan. The Governor offers 
several suggestions to avoid the re occurrence of incidents of such nature, but the most 
impressive part of the diligence is as follows: 
“As you know quite well, there are no discriminatory measures in Macau for Japanese 
subjects but if some of them by their good behaviour deserve the esteem and high 
consideration of the Portuguese authorities there are many others (Formosans as a rule) 
who think they are exempted from the fulfillment of the obligations which are imposed 
by law even to the Portuguese nationals. (…) The recurrence of these incidents gives the 
wrong notion that every Japanese subject purposely ignores the Portuguese laws. (…) I 
believe that the best way would be if you could advise the Japanese subjects residents in 
this colony (…) not to ignore Portuguese laws or to seek for greater advantages than those 
allowed to Portuguese nationals and in case they do not feel happy with the Portuguese 
laws, nobody forces them to stay in Macau.”92 
Difficult as it had already been, 1941 was about to deliver its final blow. The Allied 
forces invaded Timor claiming the need to protect the territory from impendent Japanese 
attack and on December 25 British forces surrender to Japan in Hong Kong. 
Just days before the Governor of Macau writes the Minister of Colonies saying the 
Japanese were incredibly kind telling the Governor that the authorities were making their 
best efforts to supply foodstuff to the island. The Consul of Japan had also made queries 
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regarding the situation in Timor, but most importantly it had asked if Japan could 
purchase two Portuguese dredgers and one dutch dredger anchored in Macau. 
  
The dredgers  
The governor’s first reaction to the request regarding the dredgers was to say it was 
impossible since they were needed, but maybe the Portuguese ones a rental could be 
arranged as long as the dredgers were not used in a war zone.  
In his telegram, the Governor adds that regardless of the kind faces and smiles the 
Japanese were ready to turn the requests into orders if Portugal offered too much 
resistance.93 
Just a few days later, the Governor would express his feelings of uneasiness regarding 
the Japanese behavior: “Political situation with the Japanese extremely delicate. I’m 
suspicious. It is not natural.”94 
The memoirs of António de Andrade Silva show us the high spirits of the Japanese 
after the victory of Pearl Harbor and Honk Kong and how that affected their behavior in 
Macau: “The Japanese felt like the Rulers od the Universe!... so proud of themselves that 
their attitudes became an affront and unbearable! They walked in Macau as if it were 
conquered territory, almost imposing themselves as the owners of the land, making 
demands as the winners they were....”95 despite that he also claims that the Japanese 
weren’t abusing Macau too much, taking in consideration that its survival was completely 
on their hands.96 
 
The Year of Being Too Busy Elsewhere 
After the taking of Hong Kong panic took hold, everyone was fearful that Macau 
would be next. 
Macau had absolutely no defense capabilities against Japan but the Governor had 
explicit orders from Lisbon to use all of the force at his disposal mostly to avoid a 
backlash just like the one in Timor, as show on the next chapter, having Portugal been 
accused by the Axis of complacency with the Allies for not resisting.97 
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The Japanese Minister in Lisbon was in constant contact with Salazar on the issue of 
Timor and affirm in February 20, 1942 that Macau’s neutrality would be respected.98 
In the beginning of 1942 the Japanese navy through the Consul ordered Portugal to 
rent some dredgers threatening to cut the supply of the island. To allow Portuguese to 
save face they suggested the rental to be done through a commercial company.99 The 
dredgers were to be used in the Hainan Island occupied by the Japanese. 
On the 10th Japan cut the supply and communication lines with Lapa and Ching san 
leaving the territory with enough rice supplies for mere five days. The Governor 
desperately appeals the Minister of Colonies to allow the renting asking only the garantee 
the dredgers would not be used in military operations.100 Adding “it is the only policy 
possible against such torturous and shameless people as the Japanese.”101 Permission to 
grant the temporary rental of the dredgers is given from Lisbon as long as that would not 
breach neutrality.102 
The contract regarding the dredgers would be signed in October 1944103. In the 
meantime Japan had been kept occupied by the tides of war, especially the consequences 
of the oil and gasoline embargo and the entrance of the US in the theater of operations. 
The Japanese forces in retaliation for the Allied invasion of Timor in December 1941, 
which was an island with strategic interest to both Japan and Australia, invades Timor in 
February 20, 1942.  
After the invasion of Timor by the Japanese the telegraphic communications 
regarding Macau’s problems is substantially reduced. There are several possible reasons; 
first, after the taking of Hong Kong Japan was in total control of the surrounding 
territories thus Macau had no other option but to deal with the Japanese authorities 
diminishing the confrontation and incidents; second, Japan got entangled in Timor and 
diverted its diplomatic efforts to Lisbon; third, from 1943 the tides of war change; fourth, 
Macau did not have much more to offer in 1941 and 1942 it had exchanged most of its 
machinery and other useful items for food; lastly, Macau was an important center of 
espionage where Japan could obtain information regarding the Chinese forces. 
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The prospect of war was unlikely, but severing diplomatic relations was not off the 
table. Furthermore unseure of the future, the Minister of Colonies, telegraphs Macau 
asking the Governor to have some sort of plan in case Portugal had to abandon its 
neutrality ppolicy, suggesting taking control, of the vessels in the port including foreign 
merchant vessels.104 
 
The ‘Sian’ crisis 
Having taken control Macau’s water by mid 43, the Japanese forces carried out 
inspections in Portuguese waters for the sake of stopping sm 
On August 18-19, 1943, the most deadly attack in Macau during the war took place. 
During the cover of the night a group of 200 people (Japanese and pro-Japanese) believed 
to be following Japanese orders takes control of a British vessel with 100 Chinese citizens 
that had been anchored in Macau since the beginning of the hostilities, the Sian. The 
attack was carried out from two speedboats, the attackers had riffles, and left 20 
Portuguese guards dead.  
This bold attack combined with the Japanese troop movements october that year 
when the Japanese deployed to Malaucha, Lapa about 1000 men, supported by two air-
crafts ans one counter torpedo led the Governor to believe Macau was at the verge of an 
attack.105 
 
Assassination of the Japanese citizens in Japan 
Since the beginning of the war Portuguese authorities were pressured to censor, arrest 
and allow pro-Japanese Chinese into the police force to curb anti Japanese activity in 
Macau. It was not uncommon to hear gunshots or to find bodies of anti-Japanese Chinese 
in the territory.  
This background fight between Chinese and Japanese led to a few serious crises 
namely the assassination of Japanese officials in 1945. 
On March 22 of 1945 in broad day light the Consul Yasumitsu Fukui was 
assassinated. Maorito Morishima soon protested in Lisbon 106  arguing that it was 
Portuguese responsibility to protect foreign citizens, especially government officials from 
countries Portugal considers to be friend with, and his diligence demanded the following: 
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(1) Portuguese formal apologies, (2) the apprehension and punishment of the criminals, 
(3) and the replacement of the responsible for the public order, that is, the head of the 
police department. 
Received on the 23rd at the MNE by the Secretary General the Portuguese state 
officially presented its condolences and assured Morishima that all the legal steps were 
being taken and that all possible investigation paths were being carefully considered. 
According to the report the Japanese Minister seemed pleased but complained that 
the Portuguese police hired Chinese citizens and/or connected to America, that was a 
source of unrest because the US was actively trying to destroy Japan-Portugal long history 
of friendship. 
The Secretary General simply pointed out public tranquility and safety was on 
Portuguese best interest and if the Japanese authorities had any leads they should 
collaborate with the local police. At this point the Minister tries to give the Secretary 
General a list of names of people the Portuguese authorities should take into custody.  
The Secretary General did not take the list, said that was to be given to the local 
authorities, but made it clear that Portugal was a sovereign state and it conducted its 
investigations independently. 
The contrast between the attitude of the Secretary General in 1945 and the Governor 
of Macau in 1940, when he was forced to accept the Japanese ultimatum, is stark. In 1945 
Japanese position had weakened. In March 1945 there was a sense that the war would 
soon end, on the European western front the Allied forces breach the Rhine and on the 
eastern front the soviet forces were gained ground, in the Asia theater, Tokyo had been 
critically bombed on March 9-10, Japan was losing the Philippines and had lost Iwo Jima. 
Thus, even though Portugal was keen to keep its neutral status, deference to Japanese 
requests was no longer necessary. Rapidly losing its allies in Europe, Lisbon was still a 
valuable listening post.  
Refering to the assassination of Consul Fukui, the Japanese Consul in Lisbon Mr. 
Morishima argues that Fukui was the victim of a politically oriented conspiracy 
orchestrated by the Chief of the Secret Services in Macau, Colonel Sawa.  
In his memoirs Morishima recalls a conversation with Teixeira do Amaral, MNE 
Secretary General, when he was asked to discretely intevene with the Japanese authorities 
in Tokyo asking for Colonel Sawa’s restrain: “In Macau, Japanese forces without noticing 
the Governor deployed Colonel Sawa who is currently training personnel. It is common 
knowledge tha Colonel Sawa has benn arresting chinese which is outside of his 
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jurisdiction. It is obviuosly a violation of Portuguese sovereignty. Despite this, and taking 
into account the bilateral relations between the two nations, the Governor is giving tacit 
consent to these frequent incidents.”107 
Morishima’s insight on Macau is quite important: “considering that Macau’s forces 
did not have the capacity to maintain the order in the eventuality of a North American 
offensive in Hong Kong, the idea of deploying Japanese forces to Macau in order to 
protect Japanese citizens was insistently being considered. The Japanese military high 
officials in Nankin had submitted an aggressive proposal to send Japanese forces to 
Macau which was supported by Consul Eiichi Iwai.”108 Fukui’s assassination was just of 
many technics used with the objective of creating a pretext to send forces.  
Morishima, considered that late in war the diplomatic crisis between Portugal and 
Japan was more severe regarding Macau than Timor. Morishima once again intervenes 
and proposes to the Japanese Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mamoru Shigemitsu, and Togo 
that Sawa’s agency should be immediately closed; deportation of all Tairiku-ronin; 
nomination of a new Consul in Macau, and the lift of the blocade. In mid June 1945 
Masaki Yodogawa is nominated Consul, the blockade is lifted and Sawa reprimended. 
Once again, the Japanese civil forces where essential to the restrain of aggressive 
Japanese behaviour from the military. 
 Just one month passed and on April 15, 1945, an official of the Japanese Navy, Mr. 
Shibayama, is assassinated during the morning on the street. The Japanese government 
sends an official communication109, copy paste of the one sent in March, with a list of 
four requests.  
Once again, the Secretary General presents his condolences and emphasizes the 
investigation was ongoing, and the authorities were doing the best they could to find the 
culprits. 
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Chapter 3: Timor 
 
Two years after the taking of Malacca, in 1513 Portuguese sailors land in Timor to 
establish a trading post and develop a maritime route that would connect Portuguese posts 
in Asia in Goa and then Lisbon. The importance of Timor’s trade changed over the 
centuries, but generally it was a profitable trade around sandalwood and spices such as 
cloves, mace and nutmeg. 
During the first two centuries of Portuguese presence in Timor it can hardly be said 
that the territory was a colony: Timor was ruled from Goa by a viceroy that depended 
heavily on the local authority and on intermarriage between Portuguese sailors and 
natives. The first Governor was appointed in 1701 António Coelho Guerreiro. The dutch 
had taken west Timor in 1653 and the two countries developed their commercial activities 
in the territory without the conflict and animosity that had defied the relations between 
the countries in the 17th century. Indeed the first border agreement negotiations started in 
1858 to no avail having the first border agreement been signed in 1915. 
 
Japanese Economic Penetration 
In October 1937, Vasco Vieira Garin, a diplomat with the Portuguese Ministry of 
Foreign Affairs writes a lengthy report titled “Japanese Infiltration in Asia”. While he 
notes that attempts at infiltrating Macau’s economy were minimal, in Timor the situation 
was different. The author starts by saying that these suspicions were yet to be confirmed 
due to lack of documentation, but there seemed to be a insistent attempt of penetration 
and infiltration by the Japanese in Timor. 
On July 20, 1937 it was established in Tokyo a Luso-Japanese company with a capital 
of five million yen with the objective of promoting trade (imports and exports) between 
Japan and Timor. Eventually it became clear that the company was nothing but a 
subsidiary of Nanyo Kohatsu Kaisha which main goal was to expand Japanese trade in 
South Asia. 
The Dutch Government had a clear policy of imposing difficulties to Japanese 
investment specially to companies tied to the Navy (such as Nanyo) and was vocal about 
Portugal’s need to follow in the footsteps. This concerned was shared by the English who 
as early as July 1937 show its discontentment with the Japanese presence in the Island.   
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In 1937 Europe was still peaceful but the war had been taking a hold of Asia. Japan 
was knees deep into its expansionist project, gaining ground and Timor would give the 
country a fabulous strategic advantage in the case of the attack of Australia.  
The records show that in 1936 several Japanese citizens went to the territory with the 
intention of opening shop with special interest in cabotage services to and from Palao and 
possibly connecting to Macau to sell foodstuff from Timor. In 1936 queries regarding a 
possible licence to explore cotton and other textile plants as well as factories to transform 
the cotton were made. 
On his report Vasco Vieira Garin demonstrates that as early as 1937 Portugal was 
already well aware of the collaborationism between Portuguese nationals and Japanese 
companies. This information had been given to Portugal by the Dutch delegation in 
Lisbon. The Dutch disclosed that Sales Luis, Portuguese, retired military doctor, was the 
main shareholder of the “Sociedade Agrícola Pátria e Trabalho” (a agricultural 
development society) had sold his rights to the Japanese without approval of the 
Portuguese administrative services that strictly followed a policy of not allowing 
foreigners to own more than 50% of the stakes of a company of strategic value to the 
Portuguese republic. 
The report also details the purchase by Sales Luis of manganese to export to Japan. 
The Japanese had expressed their interest in the manganese and oil deposits of the island 
as early as 1935. 
Another issue in Timor was the entanglement and allegiance of a prospector, Sr. 
Wittouck. Indeed, the British were following this individual closely. 
On January 30, 1936 Timor opened a public tender to the prospection and exploration 
of oil, mineral oils, and hydrocarbon gas. Mr. François Wittouck, a Belgian citizen, as 
President of the ‘Allied Mining Corporation’ was the only candidate and the local 
administrative powers favoured said concession, but in May 1936, the British Embassy 
in Lisbon cast doubt over the interests of Japan in Timor considering them overall 
strategic, not economic. In November 1936 in an ‘aide memóire’ the British Embassy 
claims that there were reasons to believe that Mr. Wittouck was entangled with powerful 
American and Japanese financiers in Manilla. 
The British had personal stakes in the oil exploration in Timor. In fact, Portugal had 
given the company H. H. Staughton (connected with the Anglo Eastern Oil co.), a 
procurement and exploitation concession, but the company did not seem to be fulfilling 
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its responsibilities and had illegally transferred the rights of exploration thus Timor 
started the process of revoking the licenses and nullifying the concession rights. 
Vasco Vieira Garin importantly noted that at the time of the opening of the public 
tender the Japanese Legation in Lisbon and Mitsui had shown considerable interest, but 
did not submit a proposal.  
In his final remarks the diplomat apprises the MNE: “In conclusion we should remain 
alert and act with caution in regards to any Japanese penetration attempt in Timor. As of 
now and in the near future there are absolutely no signs of danger to our sovereignty.” He 
continues, “When it comes to Japanese ambitious, Timor is located in a dangerous area 
and in case of a military conflict in the Pacific its strategic position could be coveted by 
Japan (...), but that won’t happen before a solution is found for the problem of China 
which is years from happening.”110 
Twentieth century Timor desperately needed trade. It depended on the dutch lines 
which connected to Macassar and the service was unreliable. For Garin, Portugal should 
allow Japan to trade thus opening the Japanese market (and of its controlled territories) 
to Timor’s products, but Garin overestimated the extent the British were wiling to go to 
protect the island, and the Japanese pressures in Macau. Despite being pro trade relations, 
he asks for the complete exclusion of Japanese investment and the acceptance of British, 
Australian, and Dutch initiatives. In fact, for him this conflict was also about race stating 
“For all the merits of the Japanese anti-communist fight, the truth is Japan is and will 
continue to be the most dangerous enemy of the white race.”111  
There were several concerns regarding the concession of economic rights to Japan. 
As we have seen the nature of the relation between the military branches, mostly navy, 
and the economy was a symbiosis for the sake of national interest, and secondly Portugal 
perceived Japan as greedy: “Economic collaboration to the Japanese is nothing but the 
complete surrender of the territories’ riches to its unlimited exploitation.”112  
The Portuguese Consul in Macau also warned the MNE about the Japanese modus 
operandi of diplomatic and military corps in China namely the invocation of a long 
friendship to obtain somehow a special authorization only to use it as precedent in the 
future to disrespect local authorities and rules.113 
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We also need to take in consideration the historic relationship between Portugal and 
England and how British needs could influence Portuguese foreign policy. In November 
1937 Salazar gives clear instructions to Armindo Monteiro to, in his conversations with 
Eden, mention that Portugal is aware of the Japanese intention to infiltrate Timor, and to 
reinforce the idea that Portugal is acting cautiously in this regard.114 In October of 1937 
this concern will lead to the enactement of Decree n. 28084 regulating the transfer of 
commercial rights, priviledges, and shares to companies and individuals operating in the 
Portuguese colonial territory. All the property/shares transfers from this point onwards 
had to be approved by the Ministry of Colonies and, in order to be approved, they had to 
comply with the governing principal: public interest companies/concessions had to 
remain under the control of Portuguese companies or citizens. 
With the Japanese development of its aircraft capability from 1939, British show 
concern regarding the construction of aviation facilities in Timor and Macau.115 England 
was also involved in the request of the establishment of a air line service between 
Canberra and Timor with was brought up by the Ambassador of England in Lisbon on 
May 16, 1939.116 
From 1938 to 1941 the issue of the “Sociedade Nanio-Kaisha” was ever present. In 
1938 the Charge d’Affaires had extensive meetings with high ranked officials: the 
Secretary General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, the Minister of Colonies, and 
Salazar himself. The Japanese delegate protested that Japan was being discriminated 
against in Timor since oil prospection concessions had been granted to Australia, but 
difficulties had been imposed to Japan thus what could have been a private, simple 
business deal, became a diplomatic issue. In order to avoid having its neutrality status 
questioned, and trying to find a conciliatory approach Portugal sent an inspector to Timor 
to better assess the situation always guaranteeing that no discrimination was taking place, 
it was simply a matter of national interest to keep important companies under the control 
of Portuguese.117 In that spirit Portugal offered two options, either Japan would sell a part 
of its shares to an approved Portuguese citizen or the society’s social capital would be 
increased and acquired by a Portuguese entity indicated by the Government (the next year 
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the ‘Banco Untramarino’ became a member of Pátria and Trabalho, rendering the 
Portuguese the majority holders again)118. Only after solving this core issue the society 
would be allowed to register in Timor and start its business. It was very important to 
Salazar that the Japanese did not have the impression that Portugal was deferring the 
solution hence the proposed solution. Salazar was cautious about creating a precedent that 
could lead Timor’s companies into the hands of foreigners.119 Additionally, according to 
the Secretary General of the MNE, Teixeira de Sampaio, the Minister of Japan in Lisbon 
was informed that the society was agricultural and as such legally it could not be granted 
a oil prospection concession.120 In February 1940, in a meeting with Salazar, the Japanese 
Minister shows that his government is willing to constitute another society that fits the 
necessary requirements mentioning with sadness that it had come to Japan’s attention that 
a concession had been granted to Australia.121  
The fact that Salazar had several meetings with the Japanese Minister in Lisbon even 
before the escalation of the events, shows that the MNE was fully committed to finding 
an agreeable solution to both parties. Salazar wanted to emphasize that the bureaucratic 
hurdles that Japan was facing in Timor regarding its investment and oil prospection were 
merely legal and not the reflection of a discriminatory policy against Japan. 122  The 
Japanese Minister on the other hand emphasized that the Japanese investment was not a 
political move in disguise, affirming that Japan would respect Portuguese sovereignty in 
its domains evoking a long history of amicable relations as the basis of respectful 
cooperation. Japan also calls the principle of reciprocity stating its willingness to grant 
Portugal concessions in Machuria.123  
As we have seen, in March, 1940, Portugal is officially informed in Tokyo124 that the 
Japanese Government had decided to pressure Macau in order to obtain the desired oil 
concessions in Timor. Since the beginning of the conflict Salazar had been adamant about 
his strategy to defend the territories: maintain strict neutrality and do not tie the Macau 
and Timor issues together to avoid dragging the territories together in case of a local 
incident. Salazar also prioritized the principle of not negotiating from a weaken position, 
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which was not always possible as we have seen, but when faced with threats Salazar 
resorted to several techniques such as deferring until the last minute and always publicly 
deny the existence of such imbalance. As we have seen this pressures would escalate and 
contribute to the taking of Lapa by the Japanese forces and the next year the blockade of 
Macau’s supply lanes. In the telegraphic early communications Salazar seems unsure 
about the relation between the taking of Lapa and Timor, not knowing if it was a causal 
relationship or a coincidence later explored for further demands,125 but a few months later 
refers to the Japanese pretensions in Timor as the cause of the pressure felt in Macau.126  
In 1940 Timor issued oil concessions to a Portuguese society with Australian capitals 
and had reserved an area for other prospectors possibly Japanese that would be allowed 
to begin as soon as the legal issues with the ‘Pátria e Trabalho’ society were solved127. 
Japan was not content with the state of affairs: not only the lengthy negotiations regarding 
status, but also the plot left to explore, which according to Japanese engineers was 
completely sterile128. The Japanese government suggests a conciliatory proposal: the east 
part of the island, now a Portuguese-Australian concession should be redivided to 
accommodate Japan too. Japan also shows willingness to tri-party negotiations129 but by 
the 1940s Salazar believes that Japan was interested in more than just a concession, it had 
his eyes set on a monopoly in Timor, which could not by any means be allowed.130 Salazar 
was not, at this point concerned about an hostile act in Timor, but Japanese “pressure, 
demands, and retaliation in Macau, where they are easy to conduct under the guise of the 
war’s state of affairs.”131 
 
The Palau-Timor Air Service Agreement 
Japan’s queries in 1940 were not solely about oil exploration. Japan had made several 
diligence to obtain an agreement to connect through air service Dili - the capital of Timor 
- and Palao situated in the Archipelago of Micronesia under the mandate of Japan since 
the First World War after being seized by the Japanese troops from the Germans. 
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Portugal was in similar negotiations with Australia to establish a Canberra-Dili air 
service and from the beginning had shown interest in the air lines as long as they respected 
the principle of reciprocity and were for purely commercial purposes.  
In August 1940, Japan starts showing some frustration due to the long negotiations. 
The incidents in Macau during 1939 and early 1940 had diverted Portuguese diplomatic 
efforts thus the meetings with Japanese officials tended to move in that direction. In 
September, 1940 the details for experimental flights were almost completed and the 
Ministry of Colonies was waiting for details from the Japanese authorities.  
It is important to understand the timeline of events and the intersection between 
events in Macau and Timor. Regarding the air service, Portugal, despite worrying about 
Japanese infiltration, was keen on the idea of establishing said service before the height 
of pressure in Macau. Portugal’s objective was to end Timor’s isolation and inject life in 
the economy, not only that in December 1940, Portugal signs an agreement with Australia 
to establish a Canberra-Dili air service, highly appreciated by the British. Australia too, 
had military objectives, namely the air surveillance of the region. Being a neutral country 
meant Portugal could not show favoritism and, as such, it was difficult to explain from a 
legal stand point why a similar Japanese request was not being accepted. Portugal’s 
neutral status, the situation of Macau, and the new agreement with Australia put Salazar 
in a difficult situation. To ease Japanese mistrust, Salazar allowed Japan to conduct six 
experimental flights between December 1940 and June 1941to the exasperation of th 
Allies that frequently demanded details regarding the flights. The Americans had never 
shown much interest in the incidents in Macau - given that in strategic terms its lost would 
not have had much consequence in the overall war - were now taking an interest in Timor 
and, along with the Dutch, the British, and Australian, were concerned about Japanese 
intentions and penetration in the island. 
Salazar understood the risks, but had to hedge in order to maintain sovereignty of the 
territories. The apparent inability to understand the Portuguese conundrum and the 
insistent queries and criticism regarding the air service was irritating to Salazar: “it seems 
they are unable to understand the cost to Portugal of taking actions considered hostile to 
the Japanese and the risk of retaliation in Macau. This perspective is ever present in the 
pursuit of our policies.”132 
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Portuguese authorities had strict rules regarding the experimental flighs and who was 
aboard, granting visas sparsely and making sure these flights could not become a de facto 
connection before reaching an agreement. The Japanese attaché Takeo Ueno tried to 
negotiate a system where, during the experimental period, flight licenses would be 
automatically renewed every month133. This system would have left Portuguese with less 
control over these connections and without a finalized agreement with specific rules, 
ambiguities could be explored. To avoid any misunderstandings the Portuguese 
authorities were strict issuing licenses, the flights were only allowed for technical 
purposes, transportation of people or mail was not allowed, and each flight required 
authorization. 
In May, 1941 Japanese authorities complain in Tokyo that the Governor of Timor, 
was discriminating against Japan was would not allow the exportation of cor nor copra, 
while at the same time selling these products to Australia and the Dutch. Furthermore 
complain that Japanese technical liaisons had been forbidden from taking measurements 
in the territory.134 This is the first registered complaint against the Governor of Timor. 
This animosity will, in 1943 lead to a grave crisis, as we will see. 
The air service agreement signed in Lisbon, October 13, 1941 by Salazar and the 
Minister Shin Ichi-Chiba was the culmination of almost a year and a half of negotiations 
between the two countries, involved interests of powerful third parties – the new air line 
brought Japanese planes within 500 miles of Port Darwin - that were concerned about the 
usage the Japanese could give to this air connection. 
To Japan, this air service was important to fulfill the goal of “intensively intensify”135 
the relations with the Oceanic Islands, severely constrained by distance. 
To the island of Timor these technical agreements were beneficial since it required 
the establishment of communication lines, technical support thus leading to improvement 
of expertise.  
On July 24, 1941 in an official communication from the Japanese Delegation in 
Lisbon, The Minister Ichi-Shin-Chiba wrote directly to the Secretary General of the MNE, 
Luís Teixeira de Sampayo, stating the Japanese Government was “vividly anxious”136 to 
reach an agreement in the shortest possible time. 
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This agreement was not unique in any way. On December 11, 1941 Portugal 
established a similar one creating an Air Service between Dilly and Port Darwin in 
Australia. In May 1941 Portugal sent a copy of this document to the Japanese Delegation 
in Lisbon upon request of the Minister Shin-Ichi-Chiba. Nonetheless, the Portuguese 
Legation in Tokyo informed Lisbon on October 21, 1941137 that a campaign of gossiping 
was implying the agreements were the result of pressure and threats - namely a possible 
invasion of Macau - and that the commercial line had political reach framed within the 
Japanese expansionist program in the southern seas, some commentators calling the 
opening of this air line as ‘provocative’.138 
It would be naive to think the Macau’s blockade of September 1941 was unrelated to 
the signing of the agreements, but no documents containing a direct, specific threat 
regarding the technical air service agreements were found. Macau’s governor waived part 
of the territory’s sovereignty (admitting pro-japanese forces in the police force, semi-
allowing Japanese forces to patrol the waters to fight smugglers, etc) to save Macau’s 
supply lane. It was undignified, but kept the territory from starving. The agreement 
similar to the one with Australia, at any other time, would have been inconspicuous. 
Salazar saw in these agreements a way to please the Japanese at little political cost. 
Portugal, protecting itself behind legal subterfuges, delayed time and time again the issue 
of oil concessions to Japan.  
According to the NY Times, on October 16, “Secretary Knox declared in a press 
conference on the 15th that the navy had information concerning the agreement between 
Portugal and Japan concerning a flight connection, adding that it had no possible 
justification on a commercial level” and “(…) it’s interesting the fact that Japan was able 
to ‘force’ Portugal into conceding permission to land.”139 On the 18th, the NY Times Far 
East correspondent added: “the further the project regarding the air connection between 
Palau and Timor is examined, it becomes clear it is nonsensical to pretend it is a 
commercial enterprise.  (...) daily round trip flights between Palau and Dilly, 1200 miles 
each way, sound absurd considering the extreme scarcity of gasoline Japan is facing - 
except if these flights give the Japanese the ability to surveil all the movements of the 
strategic arteries regarding transportation, supplier ships coming from Sydney and other 
oriental coast of Australia ports. The Japanese planes could send this information to 
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German ships in the Indian Ocean. Also it is important to notice, that in those arteries, an 
intense American naval movement is happening.” 
Salazar answered these allegations with a public statement published in the Diário de 
Notícias on October 23: 
“The signature of the agreement between Portugal and Japan to the establishment of 
an air connection between Palao and Dilly, and vice-versa, has been mistakenly 
interpreted by the media from some countries. 
The conversations started a long time ago, were initiated by Japan and have been 
happening since July 1940 between the two Governments. The negotiations have been 
the most correct, embedded in cordiality and harmony such are the relations between our 
countries 
To the execution of the agreement, several experimental flights occurred, and it was 
agreed that the final adjustments would be made in a separate document, for that purpose 
talks with Japanese experts who will be send to Timor will ensue soon.” 
On his report 1947 report “Timor e a Invasao Niponica” [Timor and the Japanese 
Invasion], Manuel Guedes reinforces the idea that Porugal was, from the beginning well 
aware of Japanese penetration intentions saying under the pretext of avaluating further 
commercial and agricultural enterprises in 1941 Japanase citizens – who Portuguese 
authorities were convinced were actually military personnel – went to the island to gather 
geographical information.140 
The Japanese technicians arrived in Timor on the October 16 on board of the flying-
boat ‘Sazanami’ with the purpose of creating a schedule, a price list, obtain authorization 
to use the infrastructure, establish radio-telegraphic cooperation regarding meteorological 
information, preparation of the Japanese office of the company “Dai Nippon Koku Kaisha” 
and residences for the Japanese employees. On a secret telegram sent by the Ministry of 
Colonies to the Governor of Timor, he’s instructed to receive them in “the most kindly 
fashion”, but to inform them that he does not have the authority to sign any agreements 
due to the lack of Portuguese technicians in Timor, such inquiries should be directed to 
Lisbon. Also, the agreement clearly states the infrastructures to be used are to be located 
in Dili and ‘kind’ efforts should be made to avoid having the Japanese technicians visiting 
other sites ‘under the pretext’ of assessing new possible locations. Visits to the Bay area 
should not be authorized. The Governor is asked ‘not to be difficult’ but if need be to 
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remember that the contract “was Japan’s idea, not a Portuguese one”. On the 31st of 
November of 1941141 the Governor of Timor informs the Ministry of Colonies that the 
Japanese were not demanding, behaved correctly and did not try to visit other parts of the 
island. They left Timor on the 26th.  
According to The Daily Telegraph, October 17, 1941, Air Chief Marshal Sir Robert 
Brooke-Popham, the British Commander and Chief in the Far East, declared that even 
though the extension of the air line was ‘significant’, “As long as we are awake and let 
Japan see it, I think the situation will remain as it is.”142 
In October 1941, and after years of diplomatic demarches Mr Tokitaro Kuroki would 
take office in Timor, officially inaugurating the Japanese Consulate in Timor. 
On November 3, 1941, the Legation of the Netherlands wrote the MNE143: 
“The Royal Government of the Netherlands feels it is its responsibility to warn 
Portugal about a probability that Japan will attempt a political infiltration in Timor. 
Taking in consideration the great importance of the dutch interests in these territories and 
the inevitable political feature of the Japanese projects regarding the establishment of the 
air connection. (…) The Royal Government of the Netherlands sees the development of 
this situation with great concern. It is confident that Portugal, faithful to its traditional 
politics, will resist these infiltration attempts.” 
 The Portuguese official response, November 4, emphasized the similarity between 
this agreement and the one with Australia, as well as the absence of political clauses and 
the economical interest of the country, stating Portugal could not refuse lucrative 
proposals. 
On the next day, November 5, the Portuguese MNE was informed 144  by the 
Portuguese Embassy in London that the Governor of the Dutch Indies had established a 
prohibition for the exporting of oil to Portuguese Timor to avoid its usage by the Japanese 
new air liners. 
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Just two days later, on the 7th, Washington informs145  the MNE that Australian 
commentators are calling for an Allied takeover of Timor in order to prevent Japanese 
infiltration. 
Portugal continued its diplomatic endeavors in order to assure the Allied forces and 
the USA that the agreement was void of military and political objectives, but, always 
careful, ordered Timor to be prudent in the issuing of visas to Japanese citizens given the 
international atmosphere.146 
On November 14, Bianchi – the Portuguese ambassador in Washington – met Stanley 
Hornbeck 147  he describes an interesting exchange. According to Bianchi, Hornbeck 
seemed completely up to date regarding Timor’s situation and asked to make an off-the-
record remark - since the comment was nothing more than a ‘maquiavelic’ illation 
devoided of concrete evidence – and asked in an rhetorical manner “do you recall what 
happened to the Japanese sentinels on the far frontier of Manchuria that disappeared 
without a trace during winter until the Japanese stopped sending them there?”. Hornbeck 
had already expressed his concerns in October148, stating the Portuguese had supplied 
Japan with a unique base that allowed large scale observations, in one of the aeronautical 
centers of the pacific and orient, thus facilitating their goals. 
In the same telegram, Bianchi informs the MNE that the NY Herald Tribune had just 
published an article in which a commentator argued that the air line could become a 
military base and, if that was the case, Australia would occupy Timor in self defense.  
In November of 1941 the Allied forces, firmly believed Japan would try to use this 
commercial line for military purposes. They also believed Portugal was not doing enough 
to protect the island from a possible attack. This situation escalates and by the end of 
December an Allied force of Australians and Dutch military force, with the support of 
Great Britain, invaded East Timor under self defense claims prompting an international 
crisis. Additionally, with the recent change in Japanese leadership, namely the nomination 
of General Hideki Tojo as Prime Minister of Japan the international community feared a 
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Japan that would be fully committed to a world war and not just committed to a war in 
China and Asia-Pacific.149 
Portugal was hedging, as it had since the beginning of the conflict: appeasing 
Japanese with the air-line agreement while not giving too much, that is delaying the 
negotiations regarding the oil concessions, in order not to alienate the Allies. As we will 
see, Salazar failed. 
 
The Allied Invasion 
After several months of diplomatic efforts on both fronts – on one side guarantying 
to Japan that they were given the same conditions than Australia regarding the air services, 
on the other side guarantying the Allies that the agreements were completely void of 
military meaning, that is, solely commercial – Portugal was about to lose control of the 
situation. 
As we have seen, in November of 1941 Australia stated several times Timor was an 
entrance point to their territory. Japanese infiltration of East Timor combined with meager 
Portuguese military presence, unable to defend the island in case of attack, thus left 
Australia in a vulnerable situation and preemptive action was being taken in consideration 
by the political and military spheres. 
Portugal, worried about the public Australian statements, enters negotiations with 
Great Britain on November 4, to demonstrate its willingness to better protect the island 
without revoking its neutrality status. Portugal’s negotiation mind-frame was that a 
Japanese invasion was highly unlikely, this entire campaign spurred out of Australian fear 
of Japanese infiltration and desire to obtain from Portugal monopolistic agreements. 
According to the Portuguese Government, relations with Japan were cordial and Japan 
did not require East Timor to invade Australia if so desired. In fact, Salazar was more 
concerned about an attack to Portuguese sovereignty from the Dutch.150Additionally 
Salazar asked the Portuguese diplomatic agents to emphasize that an attack on West 
Timor would not necessarily mean an occupation of East Timor always downplaying the 
strategic value of East Timor.151 
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Answering British inquiries Portugal stated that in case of invasion, Portugal would 
defend its territory, but considering the existence of the alliance with Great Britain, it 
would, not only accept British help, but it expected Great Britain to provide it.152 
Portugal did not accept a foreign contingency presence in East Timor, but was willing 
to, in case of effective Japanese attack, request support from Great Britain that would 
send an Allied force, formed by Dutch and Australian members, and this force would 
only enter Portuguese territory at Portuguese request and would withdraw as soon as their 
presence was no longer needed.153  
During these conversations Portugal made sure it was clear this help would happen 
only in case of attack, it could not take the form of preemptive action and this agreement 
would be evoked under the principles of the Portuguese-British Alliance, which meant 
that even if the forces used were from other Allied countries, namely Dutch and/or 
Australian, they had to answer to the British High Commander.  
Salazar had sent explicit instructions to the diplomatic corps saying that “a landing 
of Allied forces in our territory could become a pretext for the Japanese to consider our 
neutrality breached and act against us in Macau and in any other territory.”154 
The parties were planning to meet in Singapore for further conversations and possibly 
sign a joint declaration, but the reality of the region imposed itself to the timing set by the 
intervenients: on the 9th, fourteen Japanese citizens arrived in Dilly, after their ship was 
attacked155.  On the 9th, 11th and 12th Australian planes violate Portuguese airspace – 
Portugal promptly protests in London - on the 15th London declares that it is ready to 
provide immediate assistance to Portugal in Timor in case of invasion and finally on the 
16th Japanese submarines are detected near Timor156 and one of them is sank by an 
Australian plane, confirming that the Allied force was on the move, nearing Dilly, in what 
the Portuguese Government considered a clear violation of Portuguese sovereignty going 
against the spirit of the negotiations in progress.157  
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The Governor of Timor is given an ultimatum to allow the landing of the Allied force 
on December 17 of 1941158. The Governor refuses, but the landing proceeds due to the 
modesty of the Portuguese forces. There were no confrontations between the Allied forces 
and the Portuguese ones, the protests were conducted through diplomatic channels. 
Salazar, always trying to hide Portuguese weaken position briefed the National 
Assembly stating Timor “is in perfect tranquility” and the forces landed “believing they 
were operating with the agreement of the Portuguese Government and in our interest.” 
While Portugal was preparing to reinforce Timor’s garrison, presenting formal 
protests in London, Australia, and the Netherlands, in Timor the Allied forces were 
interning Japanese in Dilly. The Governor of Timor, trying o safeguard Portuguese good 
relations with Japan tries to negotiate an agreement with the Allies that would allow the 
Japanese citizens to be put under Portuguese authorities, but did not succed. 
The reinforcements were being gathered in Lourenço Marques, capital of 
Mozambique, and should double the number of Allied forces at the time in East Timor.  
It seemed that Portugal and Great Britain had achieved an agreement: Portuguese 
forces capable of better defending the island were to be sent to East Timor and the terms 
of assistance in case of emergency had been settled. The Allied forces were to withdraw 
from East Timor upon arrival of the Portuguese contingency that departed from Lourenço 
Marques on December 28, on a ship named ‘João Belo’ supported by the warship 
‘Gonçalves Zarco’, expected to arrive to its destination on the February 7, 1942. 
The Japanese position was at first reassuring having the Vice-Minister of Foreign 
Affairs, in conversation with the Portuguese Minister in Tokyo, said that the Japanese 
policy of cooperation with Portugal was unchangeable159. Contrary to Portugal’s initial 
belief that did not mean Japan would not attack the island, it meant Japan did not question 
Portuguese sovereignty, but the territory was no longer neutral. 
Portugal was once again hedging between Allied and Axis forces. In Lisbon, the 
Minister of Japan criticized the actions of the Allied and expressed sympathy for Portugal, 
unfortunately for Portugal Japan saw the occupation as a threat to their interests and well 
being of its citizens and needed the situation to be solved quickly. 
The official demarche from the Japanese Vice-Ministerof Foreign Affairs to the 
Portuguese Minister in Tokyo is as follows: 
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“- The Japanese Government expresses its deepest symphaties in this grave moment 
and wished to be the witness of portuguese strict neutrality policy, not only in regards to 
the Sino-Japanese incidente, but also to the European war, and now, in the Extreme 
Orient; 
- The Japanese Government has always worked with all its good will to cultivate 
cordial relations, to take to good port the issues of Macau, concessions and other issues 
in Timor; 
- Finally, that the Japanese Government is committed to, in the future, maintain the 
long good relationship between Japan and Portugal; unfortunately, in the case of the 
occupation of Timor by the Australian and Dutch forces, its only natural that the Japanese 
Navy will have to adopt appropriate measures although the Japanese Government hoped 
this could be avoided. For that to happen, it is for the best that Portugal takes all necessary 
measures in order to remove the invading forces out of the island.”160 
 
 The Minister of Japan also requested a report on the well being of the Japanese 
residents in Timor161 and later requested information on the course of the ship “João 
Belo”. 
On February 2, 1942, Japanese planes attack West Timor and on the 8th Dilly.  
Portugal vehemently protested arguing that because one of the belligerents had 
violated its sovereignty that did not mean others could too. Portuguese sovereignty and 
neutrality should be respected while the government negotiated a solution. Furthermore, 
the Allied forces stationed in East Timor, were too small to be considered a threat162. To 
no avail, on the 19th Japanese troops entered the territory to expel the Allied forces in, 
what it considered, a self-defense move. 
 
The Japanese Invasion and Occupation 
On the same day the Japanese Minister in Lisbon personally explained to the 
Secretary General163 that Japan respected Portuguese sovereignty over the Island and, as 
long as neutrality was strictly maintained, Japanese forces would withdraw as soon as 
their defensive objective had been achieved, that is the complete withdrawal of Allied 
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forces from Portuguese Timor. Portugal argued that a solution had already been reached 
with the allied forces and a Portuguese contingency would soon replace the Allied forces, 
but the Japanese Minister retorted claiming this replacement was taking too long and 
Japan did not trust England would respect the agreement, adding “C’est la guerre.”164 
Japan needed to protect its 34 citizens in the island, now under the internment of Allied 
forces. The Japanese Minister also criticized Portugal for ‘not even discharging symbolic 
gunfire at the time of the first invasion’.  
In Japan, too, the Portuguese Minister was called by the Vice Minister of Japan who 
explained the Japanese reasoning: Japan respected Portuguese territorial integrity - prove 
of that was the case of Macau - but it was necessary to expel the Japanese enemies from 
the island165.  
Meanwhile the Portuguese troops at sea continued on their way, even after the 
Japanese invasion, in part because Salazar did not want the international community to 
think Portugal had given up166.  
The importance given by the regime to the image projected during this crisis was 
completely justified. Indeed, the US considered the attitude of Lisbon towards the 
Japanese landing in Timor as ‘vitally important’167, because it believed that Germany 
might try one day to invade the Azores and Cape Verde, Atlantic strategic positions. 
Therefore, Portuguese action regarding the invasion of Timor could open a precedent of 
action168. 
It is also interesting to notice that between December 1941 and February 1942, there 
were several high level meetings in Lisbon between Portugal and Japan in which the 
situation of Timor was not the main topic, the defense of Japanese interests in Latin 
America and Hong Kong was the issue at hand.  
On February 26, Japan instructed Portugal the ships coming from Mozambique 
should not cross the 90º longitude meridian, but they were already beyond that point. 
Further instructions were given, namely the ships were to stay at least 300 miles away 
from Sumatra or Java. According to a Portuguese report, Portuguese authorities felt that 
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Japan was “trying to blame eventual accidents on Portugal.” The Minister of Japan 
seemed to believe it was Portuguese responsibility to avoid unfortunate incidents, stating 
in a meeting with the Secretary General, “it’s not just about Timor and Macau, it’s about 
the ‘tableau general’”169. The ships were ordered to navigate south to avoid battle zones 
and eventually were sent to Singapore and then Goa. 
The Japanese invasion of the island was not swift. According to a Portuguese report 
it seemed that the Japanese Consul was ignored by the Japanese troops and even their 
commander could not stop acts of violence such as the burning of the archives or the 
destruction and pillage of the Ultramarino Bank. The Consul of Japan left the island in 
the end of April 1942, he had a meeting with the Portuguese Consul on the 23rd to 
officially say farewell170. He was replaecd by Consul Saita. 
In three days, the Japanese forces overpowered the Allied force and the majority 
surrendered. A group of 400 man remained in the territory fighting a guerrilla style battle 
until February 10, 1943. 
These soldiers were able to cause substantial damage to the Japanese plans dragging 
the war for one year and an estimated 4000 Japanese soldiers’ death. Only possible due 
to the fact the population nurtured anti-Japanese feelings and provided help and shelter to 
Allied soldiers. Local anti Japanese actions would become a source of diplomatic tension 
between Lisbon and Tokyo, with the Japanese delegation repeatedly complaining that the 
population and even some Portuguese soldiers were not respecting neutrality171. 
At the beginning of the occupation Japanese authorities kept the Governor informed 
and allowed the local administration to run smoothly with little interference. Japan was 
convinced that the taking of Timor would be an easy operation and the troops’s moral 
after the successes of late 1941 was high. The Japanese military rapidly took control of 
Koepang (main strategic point in West Timor) and Dili (capital of East Timor), but the 
guerrilla took a toll on the operations. It also led to a tense situation between the Japanese 
military authorities and the Governor: Japan accused Portugal of aiding the Allied forces 
and little by little stripped away the Governor’s authority.  
 On May 8, 1942, The Japanese High Commander Sadashichi Doi gives the 
Governor a list of Portuguese administrators that had allegedly disrespected neutrality 
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and demands their punishment. In response the Governor asks for a detailed account of 
the acts commited without which he could not conduct an investigation. The Governor 
was aware some of the allegations were indeed accurate, but all the actions had taken 
place despite his requests for neutrality. Governor Ferreira de Carvalho tried to the best 
of his authority in a complicated situation - guerrilla warfare, lack of goods, under Allied 
bombings – to maintain neutrality. On his telegram172 to Lisbon on May 8, the Governor 
states that “it has been my constant priority to defend Portuguese neutrality”, he even 
admits that some Portuguese officials were disrespecting his directives and providing 
support to the Allied forces, he names them and asks guidance on how to punish these 
officials, but the Governor had a long history of complicated relations with the Japanese. 
As we have seen, in 1941 he had been accused of anti-Japanese sentiments when, in 
reality, he was just following directives from Lisbon. In the end Japanese authorities 
accused the Portuguese Governor of being anti-Japanese, of disrespecting neutrality and 
of providing important military information to the Allied contingent173. Furthermore, he 
was accused of refusing to come to terms with the Japanese military command, with the 
Japanese Consul, and even with the Consul General.174 On May 31, 1942 Japan invokes 
the need to protect its military operations against leaks of information and suspends 
Portuguese telegraphic communications leaving the island in complete isolation. 
The suspension of the telegraphic communications was, without a doubt, the main 
topic of conversation between Lisbon and Tokyo in 1942. 
Before the communications were suspended, the Governor was able to send a 
complaint to the Portuguese government regarding the indiscipline and violent manners 
of the Japanese troops. These complaints were submitted both in Dilly and in Tokyo to 
promises of moderation from the Japanese Government175. Lisbon had to wait until the 
end of the war to assess the reality of the widespread violence and murder that happened 
in the three years of occupation: 14% of the population was killed, around 60,000 
people176. 
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The Japanese Commander argued that despite the fact that Portugal had the right – 
as the recognized sovereign of the territory – to maintain its communication lanes 
(essential to the admnistrarion of the territory) the reestabliment was not possible due to 
the level of mistrust regading the Governor and requested his removal. Portuguese answer 
to the to the accusations regarding the Governor was always consistent: how could the 
MNE assess if the conduct of the Governor was correct or not if the MNE could not 
communicate with him. 177  Furthermore, the Governor was the center of Portuguese 
authority and the symbol of Portuguese sovereignty. Removing him would come at a high 
price to the prestige and maintenance of the Empire. 
Japan offered a solution: that all communications were to be made by a Japanese 
operator. Japan could send messages through Macau in open language, that is, not coded, 
and the Portuguese Government could telegraph to Timor using code.  Considering it an 
insult, the Governor refused. 
The meetings during the first months of occupation were constant, but with little 
results. The Japanese authorities claimed that they were not accusing Salazar and his 
government of breaching its neutrality, in fact, the Japanese Government trusted its 
Portuguese counterpart, but not the Governor. 178  In 1942 an important shift in the 
Japanese Legation in Lisbon takes place, Morito Morishima replaces Shin-Ichi Chiba as 
head of operations. His critical view of Japanese policy and his immense respect for 
Salazar would shape future negotiations. In his memoirs he wonders “Every time I think 
about my stay in Portugal, I can’t stop but thinking that if Japan had had one politician – 
just one – like Salazar, our country would have followed a different path and we would 
not be going through our current situation.”179  
Having spent several years working in the US (1937-1942) the new consul was well 
informed, well prepared, and became a relevant actor in the Japanese espionage efforts in 
Lisbon. Lisbon, just like other neutral territories, was an important listening post. The 
Portuguese location, making Lisbon a city of passage to the US, the importance of the 
Atlantic islands, and the wolfram trade, as well as the heavy presence of British and 
American high-level actors, made Lisbon stand out from the other neutral territories and, 
it was clear to the new consul, that breaking diplomatic relation meant losing a crucial 
source of information. His priority was to cultivate good relations with Lisbon thus he 
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had to diffuse the tension created by the occupation of Timor. This would require more 
than just an institutional approach, but one that would tackle the impact of the occupation 
on public opinion. 
In his memoirs180 Consul Morishima recalls how Portuguese, from both the private 
and public sector, interrupted contacts with the legation post occupation and recalls the 
cold answer to his official accreditation documents when he was asked to refrain from 
using expressions such as ‘long amicable relations’ and instead say ‘focus in our future 
amicable relations’.181 Morishima had been in the country for several months dealing with 
issues unofficially while waiting for is accreditation. The Japanese Legation in Lisbon 
grew impatient with the delay and accuses Portugal of holding the accreditation due to 
the unsolved issue of communication with Timor182.   
Morishima refers to the period between mid 1942 and mid 1943 when the negotiatons 
between the two countries were suspended. The Portuguese government demanded the 
authorization to send an inspector to Timor, Morishima – while recognizing Portuguese 
legal right – dismissed the requested in mid 1942 because he knew it would not be 
accepted by the military authorities.  
Also, in 1942 the Japanese Government insinuated that it would be highly beneficial 
to the countries’ relations if there was a public demonstration of support of the Japanese 
conduct from the Portuguese authorities like Marshal Pétain had done in Indochina. 
Pétain, trapped by the circunstances, had sent the Emperor a telegram stating his 
confidence in Japan and showing his understanding of Japanese actions taking in 
consideration the circumstances, but the Governor did not accept. 
Throughout 1942 Japan insisted in a list of demands183, that would enable Japan to: 
(1) defend the Japanese military from anti-Japanese attacks; (2) prevent military leaks 
especially strategic secrets; (3) maintain the public order; (4) control and inspect actions 
that could help Japanese enemies. Japan wanted Portugal to punish the population helping 
the Allied forces – which was an impossible endeavor taking in consideration the number 
of Portuguese officers stationed in the island and the strong anti-Japanese atmosphere.  
The Japanese Minister in Lisbon claimed these demands were within Portugal’s 
neutrality policy stating that points one and two were an obligation of a neutral nation and 
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that punishing those who promoted disturbances and hostile acts against the Japanese 
forces was nothing more than maintaining public order184. 
During the second half of 1942 the problems got more complex: external commerce 
had been stopped since the invasion, the island’s reserves were depleted185, many lands 
were abandoned because of the guerrilla warfare.  
In July, the Japanese miliary once again restricts Portuguese administrative power. 
The situation in Dilli was deteriorating due to the bombings, lack of goods (most 
indigenous people had run into the florests), and the tension between Japanese troops and 
the locals.  
The Governor decided to transfer the capital of the territory to Bacau. Initially was 
met with understanding and Consul Saita informed the Governor that being an 
administrative decision it was his prerogative if it did not interfere with military 
operations. The Consul served as the intermediary and after talks with the military 
commander informed the Governor no objections were raised. After several days of 
preparation, the transfer began and most Portuguese left for Bacau. The Governor would 
be the last one to leave the city. On the day of his move a Japanese military contingency 
forbade him to proceed. Consul Saita was unaware of the last-minute change. According 
to Santa, the Consul met the Governor that night and, having been unable to dissuade the 
Commander, would try to communicate with Tokyo directly. Once again, just like in 
Macau, the diplomatic corps and military corps were not working together, and the 
diplomatic agents were more understanding and tried, to some degree, colaborate with 
Portugal. In the end, the Governor stayed in Dilli isolated and did not meet the population 
until 1945. 
The relations between the Governor/the administrative authorities and the new 
Japanese Consul, Saita, were good. In his memoirs Jose Duarte Santa notes Consul Saita 
argued war should not be taking place in a neutral territory and believed in the diplomatic 
channels.186 
In August 1942 the situation escalates into complete dissorder when the indigenous 
riots begin. Portugal had a special relationship with the local tribe leaders: they could 
profess their own religion and rites as long as they Portuguese sovereignty was recognized. 
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With chaos installed, indigenous people from West Timor, joined by disgruntled East 
Timor indigenous people, Javanese, and fueled by centuries of frustration and by the 
Japanese powerful message of anti-white colonialism in Asia, terrorized the territory 
burning houses, pillaging, killing people. The situation was serious, Portuguese and 
indigenous people alike ran to the wilderness for protection. The chaos led the Governor 
to contact to Minister of Colonies through the Japanese Minister Nakayama: “Absolute 
impossibility of protecting Portuguese lives due to constant and out of control indigenous 
riots having caused several casualties. I beg immediate transport to temporarily transfer 
Portuguese population somewhere else given that remaining in Timor is impossible.”187 
Due to the limited communications, Lisbon interpreted this telegram as a request to 
evacuate the island – understandibly so – but, in reality, the Governor intended to 
evacuate only women, childre, and the elderly (which takes place in December). It was 
never the Governor’s intention for the administration to abandon their posts.  
Lisbon assures Tokyo that the Governor would not evacuate, “we have had in our 
history several cases of serious disturbances, difficulties or riots in our territories (…) 
some have died, but never abandoned the territory. The ones in Timor, if they die, they 
die as is their duty.”188  
In cooperation with Consul Saita and vice Consul Nakayama, the Governor and the 
Japanese civil and military authorities reach an agreement in October 1942: Portuguese 
people were to be interned in camps protected and supplied by Japanese military, 
otherwise the Japanese military would consider the conflicts a domestic matter and would 
not intervene. 
The agreement was signed on October 24, 1942 in Dilli that contained the following 
provisions: 
“1. Every Portuguese and their families must reside in a fixed area (to be decided) 
until order is reestablished; 
2. Portuguese can not in any way cooperate with Australians and Dutch nor provide 
information regarding the movements of the Japanese forces; 
3. Portuguese guns and ammunitions shall be kept by Japanese forces until order is 
reestablished. Portuguese may use part of that arsenal for self defense; 
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4. The Governor and Dilli’s Administrator shall live in Dilli.”189 
In accordance with the agreement, Portuguese and their families were placed under 
Japanese protection in two camps: Liquica and Maubara. Some Portuguese refused to 
move and fled to Australia. The Japanese Commander used this noncompliance to ignore 
the parts of the agreement and unilaterally set new rules for the Portuguese living in the 
camps.  The local administration worked with the Japanese authorities to meet the 
population’s needs.  
On November 7, the US Embassy in Lisbon sends the MNE a list of 23 Portuguese 
citizens killed by or as a result of Japanese action.  
In December, the Portuguese refugees in Australia tell their horror stories to the 
newspapers and public outrage against Japan bursts. 
In 1943, communications with Japan were often conducted through Germany, either 
through their personnel or directly to the German Ambassador in Lisbon. Without the 
communications with Timor, Portugal’s information regarding what was happening in 
the Island were obtained through Washington, London and, on a less relevant level, the 
Portuguese Legation in Tokyo. 
Luiz Esteves Fernandes, Plenipotentiary Minister in Tokyo, had complained several 
times, both to the Portuguese Government and to the Japanese Government that it was 
difficult to maintain a meaningful conversation with the government in Tokyo. The access 
to the Japanese Ministry took several hours since the foreign legations were far from the 
decision center, and the only way to reach it was taking a railway controlled by the 
authorities. The Portuguese Legation was still essential for the negotiations as one of the 
main producers of political reports about Japan. 
Jose Santa describes a series of events that constituted serious violations of the 
promisses made to the Governor. From 1943 the Japanese Military Police force becomes 
more and more assertive arresting people without informing the administrators about their 
whereabouts or charges, assaulting Portuguese and indigenous people during 
interrogations, and overall disregard for Portuguese authority. He particularly complains 
about the behaviour of OTORY (Phoenix Organization), Seargeant Kitano, and Seargeant 
Kato.   
In 1943 the foodstuff situation is dire: indigenous had been killed or were on the run 
thus the production had plummeted, inflation was too high, most of the population was 
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not working and most businesses had been abandoned. In order to feed the people, the 
Governor had no choice but to accept loans from the Nampo-Kaihatu Bank. From 1943 
to the end of war, the administration asked for three loans in total. 
Meanwhile in Lisbon, Morishima is trying to resume negotiations. By mid-1943 
Salazar was frustated at the stalemate, the Allies were becoming the apparent winners and 
Salazar took a definitive step towards a policy of cooperation but without abandoning 
neutral status: a collaborative neutrality. 
On August 1943 – and after years of queries, negotiations, and pressure – Portugal 
invokes its long alliance with Great Britain and signs an agreement allowing Britain (not 
the Allies) to use the Azores, a much-coveted Atlantic island.  
Morishima took this opportunity to resume negotiations with Portugal regarding 
Timor. The Consul started by protesting the agreement considering it a breach pf 
neutrality. Salazar answered sternly: “Japan is publicly violating Portuguese sovereignty 
and its administrative rights, from a moral and legal standpoint it is not in a position to 
protest. If the Japanese Government files an official complaint, Portugal will be forced to 
protest every single act practiced by the Japanese Army in Timor.”190 Morishima explains 
Japanese point of no return: “As long as the lease to Great Britain is limited to the usage 
of the Azorian Islands, Japan will not feel jeopardise, but in the future if this model of 
cooperation extends to the territories in east Africa, namely Mozambique, or Goa, in India, 
or even the Chinese coastal line in Macau, Japan will not ignore said actions.”191 At the 
same meeting the possibility of an inspector from Macau travelling to Timor is once again 
contemplated. This time Morishima will contact Tokyo and is able to convince the 
authorities to allow the trip, despite being aware that the organization would be lenghy 
and military authorities would probably frustrate proper data collection. 
After over one year and a half of negotiations, a Portuguese Officer from Macau 
Captain Silva e Costa carried out his enquiry in March 1944 and, due to the complete 
isolation of the island, this is the only official document produced about the occupation 
period except for personal memoires. 
Captain Silva e Costa’s detailed report of his trip to Timor in 1944 was unable to 
depict the dark and desperate situation of the territory given that his travels were 
controlled by the Japanese and the people who he talked with were too afraid of Japanese 
retaliation, but it brought some hope to the Portuguese internees.  
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Salazar, had centralized the decision making in Lisbon consequently the Portuguese 
Minister in Tokyo did not have the power to negotiate or sign treaties, or other meaningful 
documentation with the Government of Japan. There were several reasons for this 
decision: (1) Salazar need to control foreign policy decision making, (2) the Minister in 
Tokyo was not amongst his high ranked, trustworthy group of diplomats, (3) to, in general, 
slow down the response time. The last one may sound like it backfired during the 
negotiations regarding Timor, but as we will see that’s not exactly the case. 
While the negotiations in 1942 had been constant, they waned in 1943. The Legations 
were still in contact and efforts were made, but Salazar was convinced that “even though 
some progress might be possible at a slow pace, it was not to be expected that the 
negotiations with Tokyo for the withdrawal of the Japanese forces and the occupation of 
the territory by troops of ours would reach a favourable result”192.  
By the end of 1943 it seemed that Japan had given up on the idea of attacking 
Australia thus the stratetic value of East Timor dwindles, but despite Morishima’s 
suggestion to negotiate with Portugal the retrieval of the Island, the Military Commander 
disagreed.  
Morishima prepares a contigengy plan in case Salazar joins the Allies: changing the 
diplomats’ status so they could be accredited somewhere else too which would make their 
transfer easier and diminish the risk of arrest. His strategy is to delay the process and that 
is exactly what the Consul did in 1944. Morishima was also afraid the military would 
invade Macau: “Unfortunately, I know the Japanese Military forces and their leaders, 
always concerned with appearances and I’m afraid if Portugal enter into an alliance with 
Britain and the US, we might take Macau as retaliation.”193  
In 1944 the Portuguese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was focused on obtaining a 
advantageous agreement with the US: Salazar wanted to obtain formal recognition of the 
Portuguese sovereignty over its colonies, and the guarantee that Portugal would be 
involved in the operations to take Timor back (if these were to happen), while, at the same 
time, negotiated a peaceful surrender of Timor back to Portuguese sovereignty. 
The slow pace of the negotiations gave Salazar some leeway: he was postulating 
negotiations with the US, while trying to reach an agreement with Japan. For Salazar this 
was the perfect solution. He feared that the Allied forces would take over the island again 
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if they were the ones to liberate it and was hoping bilateral negotiations would avoid that 
ending. Unfortunately, the Allies were not willing to wait any longer.   
Salazar considered this to be ‘a new phase in Portuguese policy regarding the war’ 
and expected Allied support in Timor’s case. By the late 1943 it is fair to state the Allies 
were in an apparent advantage and were the apparent winner of the war. In the Pacific, 
the oil embargoes were taking its toll on Japan, and the Timor situation was put on the 
back burner only to be discussed by the Allies at the Cairo meeting when it was decided 
Anglo-Luso-American Staff talks would take place from September 18, 1944.  
The US considered that direct Portuguese military effort was unnecessary. For the 
US “the most valuable aid [Portugal] can render consists in the grant of new facilities in 
the Azores for the passage of aircraft for the Far Eastern Wars.”194, but for Salazar 
Portuguese participation on the reconquest of Portuguese territory was a matter of duty 
and prestige and insisted upon this point.  
Finally, it was agreed that (1) Portugal would have a direct participation by the 
employment of Portuguese military forces under the command of the allied forces in the 
operations of reconquest or reoccupation of the island if such operations were to take 
place, (2) Portugal would have an indirect participation by granting of further facilities in 
the Azores, at Santa Maria, for the purpose of facilitating the conveyance of American 
forces to the Pacific theatre of war and from the latter to the US. 
On the November 28, 1944, two agreements were signed, and Portugal promptly 
started the arrangements needed to create a contingent ready to sail from Lourenço 
Marques and several warships ready to be placed under the orders of the High Command. 
On August 17, 1945, the Japanese Consul to Lisbon contacts the Portuguese 
Government and informs that Japan is ready to reinstate Portuguese sovereignty inTimor 
and on the 20th the Minister of Portugal contacts Lisbon informing that the Japanese 
Government had agreed to the Portuguese conditions. 
The Japanese Government remained in control of Timor until its surrender on 
September 2, 1945. The 2000 Portuguese forces stationed in Mozambique arrived in East 
Timor on September 27 of 1945, but the de facto surrender of authority to the Portuguese 
Governor took place on September 5, when the Japanese officially placed the Japanese 
forces under Portuguese authority in a symbolic gesture. By then, most troops were 
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returning to Japan via West Timor. From September 11 until the arrival of the Portuguese 
troops, Australian troops were stationed in Timor as a guarantor of the surrender. 
 
The Aftermath of the occupation  
When the Japanese troops withdrew from East Timor in 1945 the damages were 
significant.  
It took Portugal a long time to assess the damages. In 1946, during the peace 
negotiations, Washington requested a detailed report of the damages. The “Comissão de 
Avaliação dos Prejuízos causados pela Ocupação Estrangeira de Timor” (Commission for 
the Assessment of Damages caused by Foreign Occupation in Timor) produced a 
estimation calculating the losses through a comparative method: (a) the cattle existent 
before and after the invasion; (b) number of trees existent before and after the invasion; 
and (c) kilos of produce grown before and after the invasion. 
The Portuguese report was sent in December of 1951195: 
 
I. Damaged Inflicted in Portuguese Territory  (in Patacas) 
To the Portuguese state 14,363,958.49 
To private residences and property 9,942,151.84 
In respect of agricultural losses 8,486,880.65 
To livestook 9,843,139.16 
 
II. Damaged Inflicted on Portuguese Citizens or on Portuguese Property in non-Japanese 
Foreign Territory (in American Dollars) 
To the Portuguese community in Manila 59,391.00 
To the Portuguese Catholic Missions in Shiu-Ming (Southern 
China) 
500,000.00 
 
III. Damaged Inflicted on Portuguese Property or on Portuguese Citizens in Japanese 
Territory (in American Dollars) 
To the Portuguese community in Japan 361,300.00 
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IV. Damaged Inflicted through the Violent Seizure of Vessels within the Territorial 
Waters of Macau 
To the British ship ‘Saion’ HK$ 71,013.90 
To private persons Patacas 94,470.00 
£81 
 
Total 
Patacas 42,730,600.14 
Dollars USA 920,691.00 
Dollars UK 94,470,00 
Pound 81 
 
Total (after conversion in Patacas): 47.260.600,00 
 
These numbers can be contested. They were contested within the Ministries 
themselves. Another report, this time produced by the Ministry of Ultramar, reached 
disparaging numbers196: 
 
I. Damaged Inflicted on Portuguese citizens  (in Patacas) 
Urban properties  7,421,234.54 
Rustic properties 3,293,294.00 
Movable assets  1,712,948.00 
Livestook 899,578.00 
Total 12,327,054.54 
 
II. Damaged inflicted on the Diocese  
Urban properties  3,392,440.09 
 
III. Damaged Inflicted on foreign citizens  (in Patacas) 
Urban properties  8,946,822.73 
Rustic properties 18,853.00 
Movable assets  676,560.00 
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Livestook 52,490.00 
Total 9,694,724.73 
  
Total: 26,414,219.36 Patacas 
 
Banco Nacional Ultramarino’s (National Bank) made its own report assessing losses 
of 372,151.84 patacas (furniture, archives, money, silver, and other assets) after the 
installations were looted by the Japanese forces.  
The reports disparage greatly, but it is clear that the colony, that was already 
struggling, was absolutely devastated by the invasion: 14% of the population died197, the 
forest was destroyed, and the fields left abandoned and the institution that had the funds 
to invest in the development of the island, was seriously affected.  
 
War reparations 
Portugal believed it was its right to participate in the process peacebuilding in the 
Pacific and the Ambassadores in Washington and London worked tirelessly to obtain a 
seat at the negotiation table. Unfortunately, according to information given by Dunham, 
the prevailing belief wa that Great Britain probably would not support Portuguese claims 
due to Australia’s opposition198. 
Salazar’s priorities in the aftermath of the war was to be awarded war reparations to 
rebuild the territories. Salazar was accutely aware that the acceptance of colonialism was 
reversing. He had been able to obtain American recognition of its empire, but without 
economic revitalization domestic resistance could arise and it would be difficult to obtain 
the support of the international community. The regime also invoked historical and 
cultural reasons namely (1) the fact that Portugal had been the first European country to 
establish contact with the Extreme Orient; (2) international law precedent set in the 1922 
Nine Power Pact, signed by France, the U.S., Italy, Japan, Great Britain Portugal, 
Netherlands, China and Belgium, recognizing he interests of these countries in the 
Pacific; (3) the existence of Portuguese population in the region.  
Additionally, it invoked Portuguese contributions to the war effort, namely 
authorizing Great Britain and later the USA to use Azores and the prolongation of the 
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concessions after the end of the war as well as the prohibition of selling wolfram to 
Germany in 1944 at the expense of Portuguese own economical interests. The argument 
was that Portugal had been traditionally and consistently a rightful intervenient in the 
maintenance of Pacific Ocean’s status quo. 
“The absence of a war declaration or the severance of diplomatic relations are 
technical obstacles not easy to overcome.” 199 wrote Franco Nogueira, one of his 
suggestions to overcome this problem was to get support the support of the Netherlands, 
Canada, and Indonesia as possible supporter. Lastly, according to Nogueira, if Portugal 
could not participate in the multilateral negotiations it could negotiate bilaterally with 
Japan after the peace treaties were concluded. 
 Portugal did not participate in the negotiations but received the assurance that “the 
intervenients were firmly resolved to respect Portugal’s rights regarding its insular 
possessions in the Pacific.”200  
In the end Portugal did not take part in the international negotiations because of its 
neutrality status. Furthermore, after the US established the reconstruction of Japan as one 
of its priorities, a punitive stance against Japan was discoraged. Once again disappointed 
with the international community, Salazar reluctantly accepted to participate in the 
Marshall Plan. 
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Conclusion 
 
The long and amicable relations between Portugal and Japan were put to test during 
the war. Even though both Portugal and Japan had common enemies, namely the 
communists, and their regimes shared some ideological affinities, the tides of war and the 
war’s strategic demands imposed themselves, but most importantly Japanese vision of 
Asia did not include Portugal or the presence of any European powers. Portuguese 
diplomatic communications show that Portugal as early as 1936 believed if Japan were 
to win the war in China, it would take control of Macau and remove all European presence 
from the territory. By 1938, Vasco Martins even questions Japanese commitment to anti-
communism, saying that Japan was merely trying to extract all Chinese riches and 
fighting communism was just a plus. 
Portugal’s strategic dogma to survive the war with its colonial empire intact was easy 
to explain, but strenuous to implement: to publicly maintain a strict neutrality, but when 
inevitable to collaborate to protect its interests, thus the term collaborating neutrality. In 
reality this demanded a cautious and skillful use of hedging. 
Portugal was a neutral country and played its game with the Axis and the Allies in 
order to maximize its gains and did not fully commit to one side. 
Salazar was incredible at playing both sides: on one hand he respected an old alliance 
with Great Britain, while maintaining its neutrality and selling wolfram to an allied enemy 
with no consequences. On the other hand, his conservative ways and being titled by most 
press as a fascist dictator gained him the respect and leeway to negotiate with the Axis 
powers who did not perceive him as an enemy. 
The political chaos of the 19th century in China changed the political landscape 
drastically. Portuguese Macau existed because Chinese authorities tolerated it earlier on 
for profit, then because it was too entangled in its own domestic problems, and other times 
because Portugal was the lesser evil thus Portugal had to maintain amicable relations with 
China in order to maintain sovereignty in Macau. Even if Japan were to win the war, 
Macau’s population was mostly Chinese population and it could not be alienated (it had 
been before to grave cost by José Ferreira do Amaral). During the turn of the century the 
question became more complex since more actors were fighting for dominance in the 
Chinese territory. One of the main actors was Japan. Portugal could not alienate Japan 
either. Its powerful navy controlled the sea lanes that became the lifeboat for the 
86 
 
Portuguese colony once the vicissitudes of war negatively affected trade, especially 
foodstuff, from China to Macau.   
Juggling the interests of the several actors was complex and sometimes out of the 
control of Portuguese authorities. Bursting through its seams due to the influx of refugees, 
Macau, just as Hong Kong, became a cluster of Japanese resentment, a meeting place for 
the Chongqing undercover agents, and an espionage center of great value to all involved. 
Japan had obtained a priviledged position in Macau and with gradual threats was able to 
infiltrate the police and customs authorities and able to recruit agents among the 
population. The difference between Hong Kong and Macau laid in the governmental 
attitude towards such activities. While the British actively supported hostile acts against 
Japan, facilitated smuggling to nationalist China, and expanded its reach through a web 
of intelligence services - the BAAG, British Army Aid Group - Portugal official position 
was not to support them, but not to chase them down either in order not to alienate either. 
Certain individuals within the Government had their own allegiances, and were 
collaborating with certain actors either for financial gain or for ideological purposes, but 
the Governor tried keeping a neutral stance.  
 A mix of lack of personnel and incompetence of the local police force could easily 
turn an open case, such as the murder of someone, into an accusation that Portugal was 
breaching neutrality by taking one’s side. The ultimate consequence of neutrality breach 
was one that Portugal could not afford: losing its foothold in Asia. In reality, Macau’s 
economy had been lackluster, so say the least, for three centuries, but the maintenance of 
the colonial empire was linked to Portuguese identity, the concept of inalienable Nation 
State. On the other hand, the world was changing fast, Colonialism, once considered a 
destiny call for the brave and righteous, was starting to be openly criticized by society 
and powerful countries alike. Salazar believed that once a slice of Portugal was taken 
away, the others would follow suit and Angola, the prized jewel of the Portuguese Empire, 
was too important to let go. Salazar also knew that powerful forces were working against 
the status quo in politics, he believed that communism was the world’s biggest threat, the 
biggest evil.  
It is probably not fair to accuse Salazar of being intoxicated with power. His 
insistence on controlling the most important folders and centralizing all the big processes 
of the country in himself were not the actions of a man thirsty for power, but of someone 
who sincerely believed no one else could protect the country as he could. 
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 Returning to Macau, the exogenous factors were difficult to control and often times 
the authorities had to rely on the good relations cultivated over the years with their foreign 
counterparts which was in itself tricky not only because there were several Chinese 
factions with different interests, but the Japanese power structure was intricate to navigate. 
There was an effort to build a relationship with the Japanese Consuls and even when there 
was mistrust there was respect for the diplomatic institution. Now the traditional channels 
of diplomatic communication were losing its importance. Military authorities and civil 
authorities struggled to find common ground and negotiations with civil authorities would 
be completely ignored. 
The widespread racist and stereotypical image of the sneaky Japanese had permeated 
Portuguese diplomatic actors. Often in reports agreeable Japanese are described with 
(what were considered to be) ‘white’ attributes, for instance “white on the inside yellow 
on the outside”. This mistrust was not based solely on racism, but the truth is Japan often 
failed at communicating its true intentions. That is, the civil authorities were constantly 
off the loop, their opinions were disregarded, and their negotiations scrapped. 
The taking of Montanha and later Lapa represented a change in status quo. Salazar 
feared that once Japan left, China would disrespect the previous agreements and take them 
back. Just like he feared that Dutch would take over East Timor if given half a chance. 
The taking of the islands leads us the the first time Portugal tied the question of 
Macau and Timor. In 1940 there was a clear statement from the Japanese showing they 
intended to up the pressure in Macau to obtain oil concessions in Timor. Salazar was 
adamant about the entanglement of these two territories. His policy was to not tie the 
Macau and Timor issues together to avoid dragging the territories together in case of a 
local incident. This stance should be maintained whenever possible.  
Salazar’s control over foreign policy decision making meant all important decisions 
had to go through Lisbon, consequently Salazar was able to buy some time. As we have 
seen, Macau’s Governor was overwhelmed with refugees, the administration of the 
territory, and the constant queries, requests, and demands from the Japanese and in Timor 
the Governor was unable to communicate with Lisbon. Additionally, the Portuguese 
Minister in Tokyo - considered a great diplomat - was unable no get anything done. Even 
going to the Japanese Ministry of Foreign Affairs was an ordeal. As we can see, the 
Portuguese civil authorities in contact with Japanese authorities, civil or military alike, 
were severely constrained.  
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Salazar’s job was to hedge the interests of everyone involved. In 1941 after the 
Japanese ultimatum concerning measures to be taken in Macau to avoid smuggling, the 
Governor was forced to cede important pieces of sovereignty to maintain the territory 
afloat while keeping the ultimatum a secret to avoid international embarrassment.  
At the same time in Timor, Japan gets the green light, despite some conditions, for 
the establishment of a commercial air service connecting Palao and Dilli. Salazar, warned 
by the allied forces in uni-sound that Japanese had military objectives, had been putting 
down the signing of the agreement for one year and a half. Salazar had been informed in 
1937 about Japanese wishes to obtain a monopoly of oil (and others) concessions, so it is 
fair to elate, Salazar knew the strategic benefits Japan was gaining from the air line, but 
the air service was not the only Japanese incessant request. Japan wanted the oil 
concessions. Salazar delayed the negotiations for the air service, but after the signing of 
a similar one with Australia and the gradual pressures in Macau, Salazar appeased the 
Japanese by granting the air licence. It was a small price to pay compared to a breach of 
neutrality in Macau, but Salazar underestimated the Allied resolution and plans for Timor. 
Salazar was not, at this point concerned about an hostile act in Timor perpetrated by the 
Japanese, but was concerned about the pressure, demands, and retaliation in Macau.  
To the constant Allied complaints regarding Salazar’s policies in Timor Salazar 
shows frustration, not comprehending why the Allies can’t understand the price of 
alienating Japan in Timor was the loss of Macau. This looming causal chain was always 
present. 
In 1941 Portuguese hedging efforts failed. The Allied forces, tired of Salazar’s delays 
and growing fearful of an invasion of Australia through Timor, preemptively invade the 
territory. This was the excuse Japan needed to attack. After almost five years of queries 
and negotiations about the oil concessions, that Japan so desperately needed, now that 
neutrality was not maintained, Japan could claim its occupation was within its rights. 
Having its discords with the Governor of Timor previously made known, it was easy for 
the Japanese to simply dismiss his authority.  
We can clearly discern two periods in Salazar’s foreign policy: (1) in between 1939 
and 1942, his priority was to prevent the threat of an Axis (or proxy) invasion; (2) in 
between 1943 and 1945: dealing with increasing Allied demands over Azores and playing 
the Allied game in order to gain enough support to regain sovereignty over East Timor. 
In the beginning of 1942 Japan was incredibly self-assure: it had obtained Hong Kong 
and had inflicted terrible damage to the US. At that moment, the Allied forces decided to 
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preemptively invade East Timor. Right after two major wins Japan swiftly decided to 
answer back and it easily gained supremacy in Timor. 
It is impossible to know what would have happened if the Allied had not invaded the 
Island first. Regardless the relations between Japan and Portugal were friendly until that 
point. Even after that the feeling that comes across from the telegrams and meeting is of 
frustration, not animosity (at least regarding the diplomatic corps). 
It is fair to say the situation changed after by 1942 especially after the decision of 
cutting communications from and to Timor. While occupying East Timor could have been 
an answer to a provocation, the cutting of communication, as well as the treatment given 
to the indigenous people of the island was the course chosen, relegating the diplomatic 
channels to a second plan. 
If we make a purely quantitative assessment of the communications between the two 
countries, 1942 is the year the relation changes. Portugal refuses to comply with the 
Japanese request to get rid of the Governor of Timor, Ferreira de Carvalho and the 
negotiations in Lisbon are halted. The German Ambassador even suggests that Portugal 
makes up an excuse to save face, such as disease, to replace the Governor, but Salazar 
refuses another humiliation. Salazar was even reluctant to evacuate the island, stating that 
Portuguese males who died in Japanese hand would die as Portuguese.  
In 1943 the tides of war change leading to a tepid year of relations between the two 
countries. Japan is trying to keep a grip in Asia, while Portugal is busy negotiating terms 
of cooperation with the Allies, negotiating the terms of use of the Azores. 
It is interesting to realize that even in 1944 when it is apparent that Japan is going to 
lose the war, the two countries do not solve the problem bilaterally. There were 
negotiations, but they were not the focus of either of the countries. It is obvious that from 
1944 the Great Powers’ will, namely US, Germany and Soviet Union, are guiding the 
smaller states diplomatic choices. 
It is understandable that Salazar did everything he could to avoid international 
embarrassment and kept how dire the situation in Macau out of public knowledge. As we 
have seen in 1941 the US and Great Britain start showing interest in Azores, Salazar’s 
priority was to maintain sovereignty over the Portuguese territory. Showing weakness 
was not an option. 
It is also clear that Portugal tried to cultivate a good relationship with the Japanese 
Consul in Macau. 
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It is difficult to assess if personal feelings affected the development of the events. 
Salazar’s diaries hardly ever show any emotions. They are merely useful to study his 
routine. His personal correspondence was the best bet to find Salazar’s opinion about 
Japan, unfortunately Luiz Esteves Fernandes, the Minister in Tokyo, and Ferreira de 
Carvalho, the Governor of Timor, were not relevant diplomats. Salazar did not rely on 
their opinions to make decisions. He relied on diplomats such as Bianchi in Washington 
and Monteiro in Great Britain. 
It is also obvious that Salazar was tired. He had been managing crisis since 1926. 
First domestically, then the Spanish crisis, then the Second World War. 
The overall conclusion is that Salazar did try to balance Portugal’s Alliance 
obligations while trying to follow and accommodate policy towards Japan. Portugal did 
not underestimate Japan, it cultivated good relations with the Empire of the Sun since the 
thirties and that policy allowed Portugal to maintain to a certain degree its sovereignty to 
in Macau. 
This dissertation also proposes the following: Japan constantly brandishes its respect 
for Portugal’s neutrality using Macau as an example but, in reality, Japan did not need to 
invade Macau. Japan had Macau surrounded; a blockade was enough to pressure Portugal 
into infiltrate Timor under the pretense of commercial enterprise. In fact, one can argue 
that it was more beneficial to Japan not to invade Macau and continue using the threat of 
invasion.  
Macau and Timor were different crisis, but they were connected, since they were 
both affected by the new status-quo Japan was trying to implement. 
Another conclusion is that Salazar maintained its economical relations with Japan 
despite its ideological differences. Salazar kept protecting Japanese interests in Mexico 
even after the invasion of Timor. Portugal’s problem with Japan in this field was the same 
as everyone else’s: the dumping – mainly – of fabrics in Portuguese territories. 
Salazar could have broken diplomatic relations with Japan without losing its 
neutrality status. He chose not to do it, and maintained the diplomatic channels open until 
mid 1943 when the Allies forced his hand. Even after the agreements with the Allies in 
1943, Japanese diplomats had meetings at the MNE and Salazar, time and time again, 
assured Japan it did not intend to declare war. 
The international system imposed itself in the relations between Japan and Portugal, 
but it is undeniable that Salazar did everything in his power to solve the problems 
diplomatically.  
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 In the end Portugal’s neutrality had to be a collaborative neutrality in order for the 
country to maintain even a shred of sovereignty in Macau. 
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1) Salazar’s list of functions: 
 
 
President of the Council of Ministers 
(Prime Minister of Portugal)  
 5 July 1932 – 25 September 1968 
 
Minister of Finance  
3 June 1926 - 17 June 1926 
17 June 1926 – 19 June 1926 
27 April 1928 – 28 August 1940 
 
Minister of Foreign Affairs  
6 November 1936  
4 February 1947 (acting) 
 
Minister of War  
5 July 1932 – 6 July 1932 (acting)  
11 May 1936 – 6 September 1944 
(acting) 
 
Minister of the Navy  
25 January 1936 – 5 February 1936 
(acting) 
30 January 1939 – 2 February 1939 
(acting)  
  
 
Minister of Colonies  
3 November 1930 – 6 November 1930 
(acting)  
21 January 1930 – 29 July 1930 (acting) 
 
President of Portugal  
18 April 1951 – 9 August 1951 
 
Minister of Defense   
13 April 1961 – 4 December 1962
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2) List of accreditations: 
 
(a) Portuguese Delegation Accredited in Japan 
 
1930 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Justino de Montalvão Coelho 
Second Secretary  Antero Carreiro de Freitas 
Consular Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jirozaemon Ito 
Osaka Vice-consul, Tomokichi Fujisawa 
 
1931 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Justino de Montalvão Coelho 
Second Secretary  Waldemar da Fonseca Araújo 
Consular Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moje Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jirozaemon Ito 
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Osaka Vice-consul, Tomokichi Fujisana 
Yokohama Consul , _________ 
 
1932 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Justino de Montalvão Coelho 
Second Secretary  Waldemar da Fonseca Araújo 
Consular Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jirozaemon Ito 
Osaka Vice-consul,  
Yokohama Consul , _________ 
 
1933 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
José Jorge Rofrigues dos Santos 
Second Secretary  Waldemar de Fonseca Araújo 
Consular Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jirozaemon Ito 
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Osaka Vice-consul, Taro Inabata 
Yokohama Consul , _________ 
 
1934 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Tomaz Ribeiro de Melo 
Second Secretary  Waldemar da Fonseca Araújo 
Consular Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito 
Osaka Vice-consul, Taro Inabata 
Yokohama Consul , _________ 
 
1935 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Tomaz Ribeiro de Melo 
Second Secretary  Valdemar da Fonseca Araújo 
Consular Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito 
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Osaka Vice-consul, Taro Inabata 
Yokohama Consul , _________ 
 
1936 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Tomaz Ribeiro de Melo 
Second Secretary  Antero Carreira de Freitas 
Consular Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito 
Osaka Vice-consul, Taro Inabata 
Yokohama Consul , vago 
 
1937 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Empty 
Second Secretary  Antero Carreiro de Freitas 
Consular Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito 
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Osaka Vice-consul, Taro Inabata 
Yokohama Consul , empty 
 
1938 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Empty 
Second Secretary  Antero Carreiro de Freitas 
Consulate Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, S. A. Ringer 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito 
Osaka Vice-consul, Taro Inabata 
Yokohama Consul , empty 
 
1939-1945 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Luiz Esteves Fernandes 
Second Secretary  Manuel Joaquim da Silva Guedes 
Consulate Personnel 
Kobe  
Nagasaki  
Tokyo  
Kyoto  
Moji  
Nagoya  
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Osaka  
Yokohama  
 
1945 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister (2nd class)  
Luiz Esteves Fernandes 
Second Secretary  Alberto Marciano Gorjão Franco 
Nogueira 
Consulate Personnel 
Kobe Consul, Francisco Xavier da Silva e Sousa 
Vice-consul, Vitor Edmundo da Silva e 
Sousa 
Nagasaki Vice-consul, _____ 
Tokyo Consul, João do Amaral Abranches Pinto 
Chanceler, Tetsujiro Jamaguchi 
Kyoto Vice-consul, Katsutaro Inabata 
Moji Vice-consul, Horace Nutter 
Nagoya Vice-consul, Jieozaemon Ito 
Osaka Vice-consul, Taro Inabata 
Yokohama Consul , ____ 
 
 
 
(b) Japanese Delegation Accredited in Portugal 
1930 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Tamekichi Ohta 
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First Secretary Kinta Arai 
Second Secretary Shin-Ichi Chiba 
Secretary Interpreter (2nd class) Shunichi Komine 
Attachés Akira Fukuoka 
Kõichi Mimura 
Yosoe Ohguimi 
Noboru Watanabe 
Consular Personnel 
Lisbon Consul, Carlos Gomes 
 
1931 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Tamekichi Ohta 
First Secretary Saichiro Koshida 
Second Secretary Shin-Ichi Chiba 
Secretary Interpreter (2nd class) Yosee Ohguimi 
Attachés Akira Fukuoka (Chargé d'Affaires) 
Kõichi Mimura 
Noboru Watanabe 
Consular Personnel 
Lisbon Consul, Carlos Gomes 
 
1932 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
____ 
Second Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires Taneki Kumabé 
Attachés Akira Fukuoka (also Chargé d'Affaires) 
Consular Personnel 
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Lisbon Consul, Carlos Gomes 
 
1933 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Akio Kasama 
First Secretary Taneki Kumabé 
Attachés Zenjiro Aibe 
Akira Fukuoka  
Consular Personnel 
Lisbon Consul, Carlos Gomes 
 
1934 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Akio Kasama 
First Secretary Taneki Kumabé 
Attachés Zenjiro Aibe 
Akira Fukuoka  
Consular Personnel 
Lisbon Consul, Carlos Gomes 
 
1935 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Akio Kasama 
First Secretary Taneki Kumabé 
Attachés Akira Fukuoka  
Consular Personnel 
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Oporto Consul, Ricardo Spratley 
 
1936 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Akio Kasama 
First Secretary Genichiro Omore 
Attachés Keija Hida 
Consular Personnel 
Oporto Consul, Ricardo Spratley 
 
1937 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Akio Kasama (ausente) 
First Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires Genichiro Omori 
Attachés Nabumaga Sata 
Keija Hida 
Consular Personnel 
Porto Consul, Ricardo Spratley 
 
1938 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
 
First Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires Takeshi Yanagisawa 
Attachés Nabumaga Sata 
Daisaku Osawa 
Consular Personnel 
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Oporto Consul, Ricardo Spratley 
 
1939 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
 
First Secretary, Chargé d'Affaires Takeshi Yanagisawa 
Attachés Nabumaga Sata 
Daisaku Osawa 
Consular Personnel 
  
 
1940 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Kikuji Yonezawa 
Third Secretary Naokichi Katsuda 
Attachés Nabumaga Sata 
Takeo Ueno 
Consular Personnel 
  
 
1941 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Kikuji Yonezawa 
Military Attaché Colonel Seiji Moriya (Madrid) 
Naval Attaché Frigate Captain Yoshio Enoo (Madrid) 
Attachés Nabumaga Sata 
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Takeo Ueno 
Toshio Yoshioka 
Chanceler  Tadashi Iwasse 
 
1942 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Shin-ichi Chiba 
Advisory Minister Masutaro Inoue 
Military Attaché Tenente-Colonel Keizo Sakurai (Madrid) 
Naval Attaché Captain Lieutenant Munetugu 
Oisi(Madrid) 
Assistant Military Attaché Major Kiyosi Hasebe (Madrid) 
Third Secretary Toshio Yoshioka 
Financial Attaché Hisao Tomooka 
Attachés Takeo Ueno 
Tadashi Iwasse 
Chanceler  Akira Tsujino 
 
1943 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Morito Morishima 
Advisory Minister Masutaro Inoue 
Advisory Minister Kotaro Ono 
First Secretary Shun-ichi Komine 
Third Secretary Toshio Yoshioka 
Third Secretary Kenichi Toh 
Third Secretary Masana Horiuchi 
Third Secretary Ryuichi Ando 
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Third Secretary Sashichiro Matui 
Financial Attaché Hisao Tomooka 
Attachés Sadamitsu Suzuki 
Takeo Ueno 
Hikoichi Somemiya 
Hiroshi Hori 
Tadashi Iwasse 
Military Attaché and Aeronautical 
Military Attaché  
Colonel Yoshisada Mishima 
Assistant Military Attaché and 
Aeronautical Military Attaché 
Tenente-Colonel Naoki Matsuyama 
Naval Attaché Captain Lieutenant Munetugu Oisi 
Aeronautical Attaché and Assistant Naval 
Attaché 
Captain Lieutenant Kenzo Inoué 
 
1944 
Diplomatic Personnel 
Extraordinary Envoy and Plenipotentiary 
Minister 
Morito Morishima 
Advisory Minister Masutaro Inoue 
Advisory Minister Kotaro Ono 
First Secretary Shun-ichi Komine 
Third Secretary Toshio Yoshioka 
Third Secretary Kenichi Toh 
Third Secretary Masana Horiuchi 
Third Secretary Ryuichi Ando 
Third Secretary Sashichiro Matui 
Attachés Tokitiro Uomoto 
Hiroshi Nemoto 
Masami Nakane 
Sadamitsu Suzuki 
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Koji Ichikawa 
Hiroshi Hori 
Takeo Ueno 
Hokoichi Somemiya 
Tadashi Iwasse 
Kanji Nakae 
Military Attaché and Aeronautical 
Military Attaché 
Colonel Yoshisada Mishima 
Assistant Military Attaché and 
Aeronautical Military Attaché 
Tenente-Colonel Naoki Matsuyama 
Tenente-Colonel Mikio Okawa 
Naval Attaché Frigate Captain Munetugu Oisi 
Aeronautical Attaché and Assistant Naval 
Attaché 
Frigate Captain Kenzo Inoué 
 
1945 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
107 
 
3) Agreement regarding Commerce and Navigation 
Signed in Lisbon 
March 23, 1932 
 
French official text communicated by the Director of the Japanese Office accredited to 
the League of Nations and the Head of the Portuguese Office accredited to the League of 
Nations. The registration of this Agreement took place April 22, 1932 
 
The Government of his majesty the Emperor of Japan and the Government of the 
Portuguese Republic, being desirous of encouraging the development of commercial 
relations between Japan and Portugal, have resolved, as a provisional measure applicable 
until the conclusion of a treaty of commerce and navigation regulating all economic 
relations between the two countries, to authorize their respective Plenipotentiaries to 
embody in the present Agreement the following provisions regarding commerce and 
navigation, upon which the High Contracting Parties are already agreed: 
 
Article 1. 
Natural and industrial products of the territories of either High Contracting Party shall, 
irrespective of the place from which they come, enjoy most-favoured-nation treatment, 
upon importation into the territory of the other, as regards both import and internal duties 
and any other advantage which is or which may hereafter be granted to any other foreign 
country. 
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Article 2. 
The provisions of the present Agreement shall not apply to the advantages which wither 
High Contracting Party grants or may hereafter grant by way of exception to contiguous 
States, or to the treatment granted to the products of national fisheries or of fisheries 
which are, as regards the importation of their products assimilated to national fisheries, 
or to the special favours which Portugal grants or may hereafter grant exclusively to 
Brazil. 
 
Article 3. 
As regards the importation into the territories of either High Contracting Party of any 
natural or industrial product of the other Party, no prohibitions or restrictions shall be 
maintained or imposed unless they are also applicable to the importation of similar natural 
or industrial products of any other foreign country. 
Exceptions to this rule shall only be made in the case of prohibitions or restrictions of a 
sanitary or other nature dictated by considerations of public health and necessary for the 
protection of cattle or useful plants. 
 
Article 4. 
Japan undertakes, for the duration of the present Agreement, to allow the importation, 
transport and sale within the country of all Portuguese wines of a strength of 21º or under. 
Nevertheless, this provision may cease to apply should Japan establish a wine monopoly. 
Japan recognizes that the appellations “Porto” (Port, Oporto, Port Wine, Portwein, and 
combinations of similar names) and “Madeira” (Madère, Madeira Wine, Madeirawein 
and combinations of similar names), together with the appellations “Setubal Muscatel” 
and territories of the Douro, the island of Madeira, Setubal and Carcavelos, and 
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undertakes to allow the importation of wines bearing these appellations only if they come 
from the aforesaid territories and are accompanied by certificates of origin issued by the 
competent Portuguese name of the actual place of origin or the expression “type”, “kind”, 
“quality” or any other similar expression. 
The provisions of this Agreement shall not affect the regulations contained in the Japanese 
laws on wines for the protection of public health. 
The provisions of this Article shall not be regarded as affecting engagements already 
existing between Japan and third Powers. 
 
Article 5. 
During the period of validity of the present Agreement, the High Contracting Parties shall 
grant each other most-favoured-nation treatment in the matters of navigation, and in 
particular as regards on maritime commerce. 
 
Article 6. 
The provision of the present Agreement shall be applicable to all the territories and 
possessions belonging to either High Contracting Party or administered by such Party. 
 
Article 7. 
The present Agreement shall come into force thirty days after the date of signature. 
It shall be valid for one year from the date of its entry into force. 
Should it not be denounced by either High Contracting Party at least three months before 
the expiration of the said period, the present Agreement shall be renewed by tacit consent 
and shall remain in force until the expiration of a period of three months from the date of 
its denunciation. 
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Done in duplicate at Lisbon on the twenty-third day of the third month of the seventh year 
of Showa, corresponding to March 23, one thousand nine hundred and thirty-two. 
 
(L.S.)                     Tamekichi Ohta. 
(L.S.)     Fernando Augusto Branco. 
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4) Accord entre les Gouvernements Portugais et Japonais pour l’établissement 
d’un service aérien entre Dili et Palao 
Signed in Lisbon 
October 23, 1941 
 
Le Gouvernement Portugais et le Gouvernement Japonais, désirant établir des liaisons 
aériennes entre l’île de Timor et le Japon, sont convenus des dispositions suivantes : 
 
Article 1er. 
Le Gouvernement Portugais accorde à une compagnie de transport aérien japonaise 
désignée par le Gouvernement Japonais, l’autorisation pour l’exploitation d’un service 
aérien commercial régulier entre Palao ou un autre lieu dans les environs de Palao, 
désigné par le Gouvernement Japonais, Dili, et vice versa. 
 
Article 2. 
Le Gouvernement Japonais, de son côté, accorde à une compagnie de transport aérien 
portugaise désignée par le Gouvernement Portugais, l’autorisation pour l’exploitation 
d’un service aérien commercial régulier entre Dili et Palao ou un autre lieu dans les 
environs de Palao, désigné  par le Gouvernement Japonais, et vice versa. 
 
Article 3. 
Les compagnies de transport aérien établies aux termes des deux articles précédents 
auront l’obligation de transporter du courrier, des voyageurs et des marchandises, et  les 
deux Gouvernements prennent l’engagement réciproque de n’apporter aucune restriction 
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injustifiée à ce transport de courrier, de voyageurs et de marchandises, par la compagnie 
désignée par l’autre Gouvernement. 
Les dispositions du présent article n’empêcheront pas que, pour une raison d’Etat, l’un 
deux Gouvernements interdise, dans son territoire, le transport du courrier et le 
débarquement ou le séjour de tout employé ou membre de l’équipage ou voyageur des 
avions des compagnies qui feront l’exploitation des services aériens prévus dans les 
articles 1er et 2 de cet accord. 
 
Article 4. 
La compagnie de transport aérien désigné par le Gouvernement Japonais pour 
l’exploitation du service aérien prévue à l’article 1er, devra effectuer ce service au moins 
une dois tous les quinze jours, en chaque sans, à moins que cela ne soit impossible pour 
raison de force majeure. La compagnie Portugais désignée par le Gouvernement Portugais 
et prévue à l’article 2, sera soumise à la même obligation. 
 
Article 5. 
Le Gouvernement Portugais assurera à la compagnie japonais désignée par le 
Gouvernement Japonais, l’utilisation de l’infrastructure et l’octroi des facilités techniques 
qu’il reconnaîtra comme nécessaires pour la réalisation du service dans la partie du 
parcours où il survolera le territoire de Timor, et réciproquement le Gouvernement 
Japonais assurera à la compagnie portugaise désignée par les Gouvernement Portugais, 
l’utilisation de l’infrastructure et l’actroi des facilités techniques qu’il reconnaîtra comme 
nécessaires pour la réalisation du service dans la partie dans la partie du parcours où il 
survolera le territoire japonais. 
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Article 6. 
Les détails d’ordre technique nécessaire à l’exécution du présent accord seront fixés dans 
un document signé entre les autorités compétentes des deux pays. 
 
Article 7. 
Le Gouvernement Japonais se réserve le droit de révoquer la désignation faite au profit 
d’une compagnie et de la remplacer par une autre en faveur d’une autre compagnie de 
transport aérien japonaise. 
Le Gouvernement Portugais se réserve le même droit, relativement à la désignation qu’il 
fera au profit d’une compagnie de transport aérien portugaise. Dans ces cas, la concession 
sera immédiatement périmée par rapport à la première compagnie et ses clauses 
fonctionneront au profit de la compagnie désignée postérieurement, sans qu’il en puisse 
résulter aucune revendication justifiée de la part de la première compagnie contre le 
Gouvernement à qui la révocation a été notifiée. 
 
Article 8. 
La présent accord deviendra caduc si le service aérien japonais qui y est prévu n’est pas 
inauguré dans le délai maximum de six mois, à compter de la date à laquelle l’utilisation 
de l’infrastructure et l’octroi des facilités techniques auront été jugés possibles ; il 
deviendra également caduc s’il vient à être interrompu pendant plus de six mois, sauf 
raison de force majeure.  
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Article 9. 
L’exploitation des services aériens ci-dessus prévus sera réglée par les dispositions de la 
Convention relative à la navigation aérienne du 13 octobre 1919 et par les lois et 
règlements en vigueur dans les territoires survolés, à moins que ces lois et règlements ne 
soient contraires à cet accord ou à la susdite Convention de 1919. 
Les avions des compagnies portugais et japonaise survoleront respectivement les 
territoires japonais et portugais selon un parcours indiqué par le Gouvernement  du 
territoire survolé. 
Les variations à ces parcours ne pourront être faites qu’en cas d’urgence ou avec le 
consentement du Gouvernement du territoire survolé. 
 
Article 10. 
Il est entendu que les concessions prévues n’ont pas le caractère d’exclusif. Les deux 
Gouvernements se réservent entièrement le droit d’autoriser l’établissement d’autres 
services aériens dans leurs territoires respectifs, et dans conditions qu’ils jugeront 
convenables. 
 
Article 11. 
Au cas du prolongement éventuel du service prévu dans les articles 1er et 2, au delà de 
Timor et du Japon, respectivement, les deux Gouvernement fixeront, d’un commun 
accord, les conditions dans lesquelles ce prolongement avoir lieu. 
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Article 12. 
Le présent accord entrera en vigueur trente jours après la date de la signature ; il sera 
valable pour une durée de cinq ans et, par la suite, il sera automatiquement prorogé pour 
des périodes successives d’une année. Toutefois, il pourra être dénonce par l’un des deux 
Gouvernements,  au moyen d’un préavis envoyé à l’autre Gouvernement, six mois 
d’avance au moins, avant l’expiration de la période initiale ou de ses prorogations 
annuelles. 
En foi de quoi, les soussignés dûment autorisés à cet effet par leurs Gouvernements 
respectifs, ont signé le présent accord et y ont apposé leurs sceaux.  
Fait à Lisbonne, en double exemplaire en langue française, le treize Octobre 1941, 
correspondant au treizième jour du dixième mois de la seizième année de Syowa. 
 
 
(L.S)                      Oliveira Salazar 
(L.S)                      Shin-ichi Chiba 
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Map of Macau 
Out of Copyright 
Creator: Macau. Harbour Authority  
Title: Planta de Macau e Territorios Visinhos com a Indicaçaõ do Projecto de Obras na 
Peninsula e Ilha da Taipa [Plant of Macau and neighbouring Territories with the 
indication of the construction work in the Peninsula and Taipa Island] 
Call Number: MAP Braga Collection Col./66 (Copy 1)  
Created/Published:[Macau : s.n.], 1922  
Extent:1 map ; 29.0 x 26.2 cm 
http://nla.gov.au/nla.obj-229837650/ Accessed and retrieved on 05/02/2019 
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Map of Timor 
 
 
 
 
 
Santa, José Duarte. Australianos e Japoneses em Timor na II Guerra Mundial, 1941-1945. 
Lisbon: Notícias Editorial, 1997. 
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 The Ultimatum in Macau       
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Source: JACAR, “Progress Report on Suggestion and Acceptance of Policies against Hostile Forces 
Including Promotion of Countermeasure against Macao (Aomen) Government’s Attitude to Smuggling”, 
C04123881900 Kato Rinpei, Chief of Staff, Nami Group, Ministry of Army, 1941.09.21.  
https://www.jacar.archives.go.jp/aj/meta/imageen_C04123881900?IS_KEY_S1=%20C
04123881900&IS_KIND=detail&IS_STYLE=eng&IS_TAG_S1=InD& 
Last access: 05/02/2019 
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